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At 5.30 in the morning of September 18, 2016, four terrorists attacked an Indian Army Brigade
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headquarters in Uri, near the line of control between India and Pakistan.
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They threw 17 hand grenades and engaged in an armed battle for six hours, at the end
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of which all four militants were killed, but so were 17 people on the Indian side, a death
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toll that would rise as the days went by and some of the injured succumbed.
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This presented a great challenge for the Indian government.
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Earlier in the year, there had been a similar attack on Pathankot and the Indian public
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was restless and wanted retaliation of some sort.
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Narendra Modi's government had spoken like hawks on the campaign trail.
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Once they came to power in 2014, though, they had wisely made overtures towards peace.
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But the attack was a step too far.
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Something had to be done.
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Welcome to The Scene and The Unseen, our weekly podcast on economics, politics and behavioral
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Please welcome your host, Amit Verma.
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Welcome to The Scene and The Unseen.
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Our weekly podcast on the scene and unseen effects of public policy.
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11 days after the Uri attacks, the Indian government carried out what it described as
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surgical strikes against terrorist launchpads across the border in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.
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In today's episode, I'll discuss both the intended effect and the unintended consequences
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of the military action.
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First, the scene effect.
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The scene effect of the surgical strikes was that India had demonstrated that it would
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And this was expected to be a deterrence against similar future attacks from Pakistan.
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But is it really all that simple?
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My guest on the show today to help me navigate some of the nuances of the surgical strike
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and to talk about some of his unseen effects is Pranay Kotasthane, a research fellow at
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the Takshashila Institution.
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Pranay, welcome to the show.
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So first thing is, I don't like the term surgical strike itself, I would prefer to call it say
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something a boring name like operational conventional retaliation.
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The reason being that surgical strike, the word itself doesn't give much information
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So whereas when we talk about an operational conventional retaliation, why I say that is
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because neither was this operation at a tactical level, which was happening anyways earlier.
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So there are border action teams which go into the LOC from both sides and these attacks
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have been happening since long time back.
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So these were happening earlier.
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But the difference this time was that this time many elements of national power came
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together and there was an ownership of the attack right at the highest governmental level.
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There was a diplomatic push as well.
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So there was an operational strategy behind it and hence it is an operational retaliation
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and at a conventional level.
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So I would prefer to call it operational conventional retaliation.
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So if you consider what happened during that time, there were Uri attacks, military campers
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So in that scenario, what would be the type of options that an Indian government would
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So broadly there could be three options.
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One is that India responds to such terrorist attacks which have been happening against
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India for a long time with its own terrorist attacks on Pakistan.
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The second one would be exercising strategic restraint and not attacking Pakistan because
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it would lead to escalation, so on and so forth.
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And the third option would be what India did, either using air power or using its own border
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action teams, etc., do a retaliatory strike.
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So these are the three broad options.
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Now India chose the third option.
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Now when we talk about unseen effects, none of these actions are Pareto optimal.
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So there would be effects of each of them.
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So what were the effects of this, right?
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That is what we're talking about.
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So one thing the unseen effect or which is becoming more and more seen now is that the
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ceasefire is pretty much over.
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There was a ceasefire in place since 2003 and because of that terrorism was sufficiently
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down in Kashmir as well, not much intrusion happening.
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But now that is all gone because of this.
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In fact, a few days back we also had Pakistani border action team killing three Indian soldiers
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and beheading them, etc.
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So that is going to be a norm going in the coming days as well.
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So there is more violence.
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The attacks haven't stopped.
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In fact, what has happened is instead of a terrorist attack there, what we are seeing
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is more cross-border shelling.
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And what it does is that these cross-border shellings have been used to infiltrate militants,
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etc., which will again increase a lot more given that we are in a situation when our
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own internal political situation in Kashmir JNK is very is on the tenterhooks.
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This is really going to be a big problem, right?
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So more ceasefire violations, that means more infiltration can happen and then the terrorism
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in valley can again rise.
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So give me a little bit of background on the status quo before this.
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The ceasefire that existed, was it like a tacit agreement between the two armies or
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was it something that was?
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It was a formal agreement which was signed in 2003, which agreed that there will be a
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cessation of hostilities on the border.
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So if there were any cross-border firing, there was a protocol that you need to report
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it and you need to say how many rounds were fired and things like that.
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So that was a formal way.
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So there were instances when the ceasefire was violated, but you knew that it was violated
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because you could report it, etc., and both sides had to accept agreements, exchange
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So that was the status.
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But after this, the amount of violence has increased substantially.
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So the intention of this, the way the rhetoric goes would be that with a strong surgical
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strike, there would be some amount of deterrence that we would show that we meant business
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and they would not attack us anymore.
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But you're saying the opposite has happened.
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The ceasefire is over, violence has gone up and now it's just no holds barred.
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So again, there are advantages to it.
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The advantage being that out of the three options that I mentioned earlier, this is
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the only option which probably puts a lid on the sub-conventional zone in which Pakistan
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So because now it knows whenever there, if there are terrorist attacks, there is a chance
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that India might retaliate in a different manner.
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Can you explain what you mean by sub-convention?
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Sub-conventional just means an attack which does not involve the conventional army.
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So it means terrorism, classic case.
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So that was what Pakistan was doing and India didn't have its own terrorists.
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So India was responding to it using traditional intelligence gathering or trying to get better
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information about where these terrorists were.
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But that was what India's response was.
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So this is what we call conventional threshold.
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At which point would India use its own conventional forces?
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Now India has brought its conventional threshold significantly down after this.
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The intent is clear that if there are attacks of the terrorist kind also, we might respond
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using our conventional forces.
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So that is an advantage and yeah, there's a deterrence which is set into this.
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So and there are a few elements which can make this strategy work.
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For example, if this, since this act was done immediately after a terrorist strike, it is
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seen as a retaliatory strike.
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And that's an advantage because then you can drum up international support as well.
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For instance, here US batted for what India had done.
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Second thing, it also works if the attack is done in such a way that it does not destroy
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any core assets of the Pakistan army and it gives them a face saving exit and it gives
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them motivation to stop escalation.
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The biggest disadvantage of all this is that it might escalate.
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So to prevent escalation, if Pakistan army feels that, okay, I can sustain this damage,
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but I don't want to take this on further, that these are the type of conditions you
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So if this attack was done, like this attack was done on a terrorist launch pad, it was
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just 20 kilometers across the border, right?
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In that region, there won't be no big terrorist camps, etc.
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So it was just launch pads, they are destroyed.
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So there is some motivation for Pakistan army to say, oh, hey, let's stop, we agree there
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was some damage done and that's all.
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But if it were on say a big Pakistani military establishment, then there are enough forces
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in Pakistan, which would cause it to spiral up and the attack would be high.
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So are you saying for the intended effects of the surgical strike to manifest, you need
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a perfect storm of circumstances to happen and without that perfect storm, the unintended
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effects will actually lead to an increase in the probability of escalation.
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So for instance, even here, right?
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When this attack happened at that time, there was a churn in the Pakistani military establishment
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Shahid Sharif was going to go out.
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So that was also a reason because of which Pakistan army didn't retaliate as much because
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everyone is looking for who will be for all sudden and the Pakistani prime minister chooses
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So everyone was uncertain about what would the political establishment do.
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So there wasn't as much retaliation from the Pakistani army side.
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So it was a sort of a limbo situation.
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But that might not work in another scenario where the Pakistani army probably just six
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months later from now when the new army chief takes place and he might have a point to show
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and if similar things happen there, we might see a totally different result.
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And do you think another unseen effect is actually in the domestic constituency that
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now that the PM has shown his willingness to retaliate an attack of the sort, there
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is pressure on him to retaliate to all future attacks.
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That's the new normal which has been set, right?
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That if so many people died when in Uri if 18 people had died, you did something.
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Why not now when say 28 people died or something like that, right?
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So such numbers would keep coming and it sets an expectation that India has to attack on
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But that is something which is a negative and an unseen negative impact of such an attack.
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So the unseen effect of the surgical strikes is not just that violence has gone up because
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the ceasefire has effectively ended, but also that the probability of future escalation
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Probability of future escalation is higher.
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So what you would want to do in order to make this work is first do it immediately after
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a terrorist attack to signal that we are attacking and then you would want the Pakistan army
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to not escalate further.
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Now how you can do that is one thing you wouldn't want to signal a lot of jingoism which actually
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happened after these attacks, right?
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So you, a DGMO declares that yes, we have attacked, we don't have any intentions of
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taking it further, which was done in this case as well.
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But after that, it doesn't happen that the entire Indian setup is going against the Pakistan
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army and in fact, egging them on to take a bigger.
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But in a sense, the jingoism is coming from quarters that are outside the government's
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So that's something that the government might not control.
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But here in this case, you would see in even the government, official government rhetoric
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was taking it to the next level, right?
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That could have been avoided.
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So if it is outside the government circle, yes, it can't be.
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So given that the jingoism can't be avoided, let me then ask you that supposing you could
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be taken back in time and let's say that the prime minister has somehow gone forward in
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time and heard this podcast and listen to your words of wisdom and he were to ask you
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Given that the jingoism and all is not controllable.
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What would your advice be?
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What's your strategic and tactical advice?
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So I personally feel that it is important to signal that India has multiple options
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and hence this particular strike was a good option to indicate that we were not only limited
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to engaging in sort of intelligence gathering or the conventional means of countering terrorism,
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but we have another option with us.
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So it's a good signal to do.
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So given that option was not there at all before, full national power backed effort
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for countering terrorism, I would have probably done given the same advice.
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But now that it is already done, now we would probably want to explore more options rather
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than having the same response.
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So out of the three options that we discussed earlier, right?
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One option was if India is always at the receiving end of terrorism, can India have its own terrorists?
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Now that is a very dangerous option, right?
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You wouldn't want to do that because that neither restricts Pakistan's options, neither
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gives any semblance of peace on the Indian side.
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And in fact, with the situation that Kashmir is in, we are actually, the situation will
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So out of the three options, you'd count that out.
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The second option would be strategic restraint, right?
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So withstand Pakistan's attacks, probably formulate a diplomatic response, get US, Saudi
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Arabia and China, which are big powers and which can take Pakistan's side to come forcefully
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Now US did, but it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia and China would go against Pakistan.
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Actually the worst, the best we can expect is they would not go out taking Pakistan's
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side in diplomatic fora.
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So that is the second option.
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This is something that we'd been doing from a long time, right?
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So there were no other options left.
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So in that sense, when this was done, now there is an uncertainty which is introduced
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and veterans rest on uncertainty.
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So in that way, this option indicates to the Pakistani side that India's sort of more arrows
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But do you think he also reduces the options for himself by almost painting himself into
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a corner because when this next strike comes, there'll be pressure on him to respond similarly
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Yes, that is the other side of it.
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That's another unseen effect of this.
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So now going ahead, possibly what would happen is they would need to develop more options
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for doing this so-called surgical strike itself, right?
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And then defining what are the levels at which these options would need to be taken.
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So does an attack on a military establishment also constitute a grave enough danger to go
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So the various levels of attacks would have to be decided and that's something that we've
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gotten ourselves into that situation.
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So there's no point in debating whether we could have taken ourselves into an alternate
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But given that we are in this situation, we would have to make do with it and explore
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more options within this operational conventional retaliation, which can signal to Pakistan
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that terrorism won't be tolerated.
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Rane, thanks so much for coming on the show.
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It's a pleasure talking to you.
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When it comes to managing a conflict, it often happens that all the options before you are
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bad and you need to pick the least bad option.
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When the country was crying out for a strong retaliation from India, the surgical strike
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seemed an apt response.
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But while the scene effect was that it ostensibly sent a strong message across the border and
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quietened the bloodlust within India, the unseen effect was that the ceasefire of more
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than a decade was broken and violence actually went up.
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So did the possibility of escalation.
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All the other options before us were quite unappetizing as well, but it helps to know
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what the unseen effects of this one were, especially as cross-border violence has actually
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gone up after these surgical strikes.
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The India-Pakistan conflict, it seems, will never come to an end, but this episode of
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The Scene and the Unseen has.
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Next week on The Scene and the Unseen, Amit Verma will be talking to Prithviraj Mukherjee
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about maximum retail price.
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For more, go to sceneunseen.in.
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If you enjoyed listening to The Scene and the Unseen, check out this exciting new podcast
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Keeping it Queer is hosted by my friend Naveen Narona and he profiles LGBT people from all
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Check it out on AudioBoom or iTunes.
