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Welcome to the IVM Podcast Network.
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I had a strange dream the other night.
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I dreamed that I died and went to heaven.
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At least that's what the entry gate said.
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There was a sign that told me welcome to heaven.
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So I went in and there was some sweet music at the start and I thought, ah, this is going
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Maybe there will be unlimited seafood platters here.
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Maybe there will be slaves in silk harem pants who will hold up grapes above my face as
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I reclined languorously on a couch.
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All day long, I will get massages from voluptuous women who keep telling me how slim I am, who
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giggle at all my bad jokes and flirt with me so endlessly that an accidental non flirtatious
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statement seems like downright rudeness.
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The music will be mellow.
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The saffron will be yellow.
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Instead, imagine my shock and horror when I find that it's really a dark and dingy
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There are cockroaches all over.
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It smells like the underperformer in the Sulab Shorchalae family.
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There is ice cold water dripping from the ceiling.
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There are mosquitoes as big as frogs.
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There are frogs as big as cats with slimy skin that gives off mild electric shocks when
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The chairs have spikes on them and worst of all, the music is Justin Bieber.
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I am in shock when I see all this.
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I turn around towards the entrance and I see a babu in a safari suit wearing a badge that
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says undersecretary, department of salvation.
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He replies, we nationalized it.
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Welcome to the scene and the unseen.
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Our weekly podcast on economics, politics and behavioral science.
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Please welcome your host Amit Varma.
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Welcome to the scene and the unseen.
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My topic for today is public sector banks.
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In 1969, Indira Gandhi carried out a big wave of bank nationalizations with immensely noble
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Were those bank nationalizations good for us?
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What were their unintended effects?
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Indeed, our public sector banks structurally flawed in such a way that the very concept
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To discuss all this and more, I have as my guest on the show, my very good friend Kumar
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Anand, an economist based in Mumbai.
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Welcome to the show, Kumar.
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Thank you for having me.
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Kumar, tell me, in 1969 when Indira Gandhi carried out her wave of bank nationalizations,
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what were the stated intentions behind the move?
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The stated reasons could broadly be categorized into two of them.
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One was financial inclusion.
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So not many people had access to the institutional form of credit.
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So the government wanted to make those forms of credit available to people who were otherwise
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And second was directing credit into areas which government thought was necessary in
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which areas the credit should go.
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So it was a laudable thinking that, hey, people in rural areas don't have access to bank credit
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and private banks won't open up there.
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So let's nationalize and then we can open up branches anywhere and give credit to people
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who otherwise wouldn't get it.
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So in hindsight, when academics have studied this phenomenon, they have said that financial
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inclusion and directed credit were the two main reasons.
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But the government's stated objective at the time itself, if you read the ordinance, when
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these ordinances were promulgated and banks were nationalized, the instrument through
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which it happened, they have said that we are basically taking these resources so that
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we can better plan the development of the country.
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As you know, after independence, what we had done was we adopted a central planning model
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And for that, you need a lot of resources.
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But the problem that India faced, that we had a democracy and private properties.
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So you can't do the kind of planning which, for example, Soviet Russia did.
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So you had to do these kind of appropriations.
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So in a sense, it's just as Nehru made the mistake of thinking, oh, India needs to be
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a planned economy and not realizing that economies grow by themselves and the government should
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just essentially stay out of the way and maintain the rule of law.
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And Indira took it one step forward by saying that, hey, we need more resources to control
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So we will take it from the private sector.
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Yeah, in a way, we were not learning the lessons.
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So for example, the planning entire thing started in 1950.
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And during the time we nationalized in the decade of 1950, nationalized transportation,
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we nationalized mining, we nationalized parts of insurance corporations.
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But always the reason of not getting the right result from the planning was given that we
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don't have enough resources.
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So you kept on trying to get more and more resources.
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And it was in that same spirit that we nationalized the bank in 1969 and then again in 1980.
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Now, tell me something.
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One of the interesting things about the nationalizations of 1969 and all of the other similar measures
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that Indira carried out were that despite the economic reasoning given, which you've
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just laid out, there was also a political backdrop to it.
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Can you tell me a little bit about that political backdrop?
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The little political backdrop could broadly be, I think, framed in terms of that all major
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political parties and the entire rhetoric at the time was extremely interventionist
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So no matter all the mainstream parties were different shades of, you could say interventionism.
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With the sole exception of swatantra, which was, yeah, which died soon after.
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So what they were trying to do is they were trying to outdo each other.
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So you want to appear more pro poor.
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So you have to go and take away properties of someone, people who are otherwise rich.
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So bankers, insurance people who run insurance companies, you take away those properties
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and say that, yes, we are doing it for poor and we are directing resources so that in
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future probably India will develop.
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Very intuitive, zero-sum thinking in other words.
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And the interesting immediate backdrop is that Indira Gandhi was sort of, this is when
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the Congress kind of broke into two, Congress I and Congress O. And for Indira, because
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the other faction of the Congress was leaders who had lived through the narrow years, but
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kind of learned from the mistakes and were trying for a course correction.
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The only way for Indira to differentiate herself was to go further leftward.
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And this kind of pro-poor rhetoric, these actions of course harm the poor the most,
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but the rhetoric is pro-poor, was a very good way of setting her brand apart.
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You know, Garibi Hata, Indira is India and so on.
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So tell me something, just going back to the scene objectives.
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Before we get to the unseen effects, to what extent were even those scene objectives attained?
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Well, frankly speaking, not much.
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And when you nationalize these banks, and so as I was mentioning, the first tranche was
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done in 1969 when you nationalize 14 banks.
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And then again in 1980 when you nationalize six more.
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So what you had was majority of the banking was all publicly owned, all owned by the government
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So you couldn't say that what you don't have a basically a counterfactual.
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So you can't say if there was a private sector bank, what would have happened?
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Because all banking in India at the time was owned by the government and run by them.
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So both the objectives of financial inclusion and directed credit, in hindsight people have
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In 2008, I think planning commission set up a committee under the chairmanship of Raghuram
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Singh, and he studied public sector banking in a little bit detail, did some studies on
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the ransom numbers and judged the effectiveness of public sector banking having existed for
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now about 30, 40 years, what were the success and on both the measures, it turned out that
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they had not done really well.
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So just to quickly tell you about a few of them.
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So take for example, financial inclusion.
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On financial inclusion, the committee found that poor in richly branched urban areas have
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no more access than in poor in rural areas.
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So the problem of financial inclusion is not so much about availability of branches, but
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Second, for example, could be that they found that no systematic relationship existed between
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regional credit disbursement and the presence of a public sector bank.
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And they also found that in rural areas where private banks are present, they don't discriminate
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So for at the end of the day, it's business for them.
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So if, and Rajan in fact has concluded that the kind of environment you want to build
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is where you compete for the poor.
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Now when you look at the other objective, which was directed credit in recent years,
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we have seen that private banks have done better than public sector banking and achieving
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the priority sector lending criteria.
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Just to give you a quick background, the priority sector lending is something that RBI mandates
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that every commercial bank in India, private or public will have to lend 40 rupees out
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of every 100 rupees that they lend out to practice sectors, which are agriculture, micro,
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small and medium enterprises, et cetera, et cetera.
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So in those areas, the committee found that the private sector banks have done a much
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better job than a public sector bank.
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Then again, coming back to the same directed credit, they also found that in terms of loan
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timing, in times of drought in a district, private banks appear to provide more agricultural
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loans, while public sector banks provide more consumption loans.
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Again in long term, which is harmful.
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And when it comes to quality of directed lending, the share of NPAs in the PSL has been higher
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for public sector banks.
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And the greater efficiency and the higher quality to the private banks providers, of
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course, because of the incentives involved, which we'll come to later.
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But I just wanted to point out this funny mishearing that when you spoke about the Raghuram
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Rajan committee, you said the ransom numbers, and I heard that as ransom numbers, which
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is sort of an appropriate mishearing.
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Now let's get to the crux of the matter.
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Before we even get to the unseen effects, the unseen effects are really a consequence
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of the incentives in play, how the incentives are different in public sector banks from
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Can you elaborate a little bit on that?
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If you think about it, think of any government enterprise.
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Right now we are discussing public sector banks, but that is true for almost any other
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So when you're running an enterprise, what is your objective?
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If it is a private enterprise, the objective is profit maximization.
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Now I should forewarn that the government and the public sector banks themselves, they
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know that the profit maximization is not their goal.
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So their goal is financial inclusion and directed credit.
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And we just saw that, you know, they have not been able to successfully achieve those
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Now the incentive, the way it works for public sector bank is that people who work there,
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their jobs are tenured.
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They don't have too much of, you know, they have complete job security.
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So no matter what, you know, mishap happens, their jobs are guaranteed.
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They don't have any incentive or disincentive because if they do a good job, they're not
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going to get a great pay hike or if they do a bad job, they're not going to get a wrap
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So essentially what is true of all government, what is true of public sector banks therefore
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also is what Feynman mentioned in his four ways of spending, which is Feynman's law of
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So there are four ways in which you can spend money.
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One you can spend your own money on yourself when you obviously try to maximize value because
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you're spending it on yourself, but you also want to economize because it's your own money.
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The other is when you spend your money on someone else, when you want to economize,
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but you don't care so much about value because it's going to someone else.
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The third is when you spend someone else's money on yourself when you want value, but
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you don't really care about economizing because it's someone else's money.
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Such as for example, if you work in a company and they send you on a foreign trip and you'll
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be ordering whatever you want in room service because that's taken care of by the company.
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And the fourth way is when you spend somebody else's money on somebody else where you don't
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care about value and you don't care about economizing, it's not your money, you're not
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spending it on anyone else.
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And that is all of government.
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And to add to that, to add to this is the fact that all of government is therefore also
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So even those incentives aren't there, it's just their incentives revolve around how they
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can use their power for personal benefit.
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And that is something that is a problem with any public sector enterprise, especially public
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sector banks and one reason why they haven't achieved their objectives.
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Anyway, you could say that's true, that's correct.
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So getting to the crux of the matter, the unseen effects, can you elaborate on some
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of the unseen effects that come from these perverse incentives?
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There are too many, but we'll limit ourselves to a few of them.
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First you can directly look at what are the direct costs in terms of, so these banks have
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to regularly go for recapitalization and because it's government-owned, so the liability lies
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on the government and government has to finance it.
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That means we taxpayers have to pay for it.
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And some of the data that we had collected some time ago, we found that in about 30 years
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from 1985-86 onwards till now, the amount of money that taxpayers had to pay is 1,47,000
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crore for the recapitalization of banks.
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Now imagine the direct costs which we incur for maintaining these banks, all those alternate
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uses that these money could have been used for.
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We know that our criminal justice system is so poorly staffed in terms of policemen and
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the number of judges you can hire.
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So 1,47,000 crore is a lot of money.
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So of course 1 is the direct cost itself.
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Then this also promotes inefficiency in the entire banking system.
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So for example, the people as we were just discussing, the people who run this, they
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don't have the skin in the game.
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So think of the example like Maruti when it comes to car industry and Bajaj when it comes
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So you didn't see much of, or BSN or MTNL when it came to telephone.
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So you didn't see much of technological advancement when it was happening, when they had sort
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of almost a monopoly on these sectors.
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So similarly the same is true with banks.
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So for the longest period you didn't see any advancement and even today public sector bank
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almost always one step behind the advancement that the private sector banks have done.
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Many of the public sector banks struggle with running ATMs, so internet banking is crashed,
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they don't run very efficiently.
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In fact just to take this point forward about inclusion and you mentioned the telephones
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and I'm glad you do so.
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Like I grew up in the 80s where we had one government telecom provider which was MTNL
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and we had one airline which was Air India slash Indian Airlines for domestic and foreign.
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And what you found was now I was from a privileged family, we had phones at home, but otherwise
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if you applied for a phone you had to, there were 5 year waiting periods and so on.
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Massive scarcity, not just technology, just basic scarcity.
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And similarly with airlines only very very rich people could use them, even the common
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middle class guy couldn't dream of flying, it was like a very big deal at the time.
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And what happened is the moment the government opened it up because of competition, inclusion
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Right, today anybody can buy a phone, today your maidservant who comes home has a phone
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which can do so much more than the most advanced technology of those times.
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And today far more people fly than back in the day, it's become much more commonplace.
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So the best way of increasing inclusion in these specific sectors was simply opening
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And today therefore MTNL seems irrelevant, Air India seems irrelevant and hopefully won't
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exist for too long as a government owned company.
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And why doesn't the same logic apply to banking?
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Well, that is a question which has been unfortunately not even been asked.
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So whether it comes to academicians, they think this as a political economy problem
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this is unsolvable, so they just can't touch it.
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Raghuram Rajan committee report when it was giving us recommendation, it falls short of
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suggesting privatization of the banks.
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The most recent example is in 2014, I think it was RBI which constituted a PJ and I committee
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And I think they are the ones who delve very deeply into the governance of public sector
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And they also almost have explicitly said that we can't consider almost privatization
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of banks, so their entire set of recommendations just veered around what all they can do within
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So essentially they will identify sort of a holy cow.
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So they will identify the problem correctly and they know what's wrong with it, but they
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just stop short of suggesting the correct solution even though they know it.
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Is that because of pressures on the political economy per se?
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I don't know, maybe it could just be that they see this as a holy cow, while at some
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point of time, one of these guys have also mentioned that the RBI has mandated private
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sector lending, which should achieve the objective of the government.
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So no matter whether you are ICC bank or a state bank of India, you have to give certain
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So in this case, 40% and 80% of that goes to agriculture directly to, you know, the
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credit risk person should go into these areas.
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So it should not matter.
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I mean, you've already mandated.
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So whether it is a state bank of India tomorrow gets privatized, they will still have to
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And there are arguments against such mandates also, but be that as it may, if you have the
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mandate, you don't need the public sector banks because your purpose is achieved and
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it's achieved better and more efficiently.
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But I'm sorry, I interrupted you and set you off on this digression.
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So the first two unseen effects you mentioned were one, when banks get recapitalized, it
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basically comes from taxpayers money, which is us.
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And you mentioned the humongous amount of money spent on it.
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Only the last three years, it was 50, 50,000 crores.
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The last three years has been including this year, this financial aid is 50,000.
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These figures don't mean a thing to me because I can't comprehend 50,000 crores.
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I can comprehend 50,000 or even 50 crores.
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I mean, if you stacked up 10 rupee coins, you'd probably get from here to the moon.
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We leave it to someone else.
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If you take a different currency, probably Mars event.
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I mean, Zimbabwe currency, you can just get out of the Milky way, right?
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So the two unseen effects, I apologize.
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You mentioned were direct, the fact that, or the recapitalization expenses are basically
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And you've demonstrated how this happened through the years, 50,000 crores over the
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And the second is that there's inefficiency because of incentives, because the bureaucrats
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who run the banks have no skin in the game, as you put it.
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And therefore they don't really, I mean, why should they do a good job?
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So we have been listening recently, a lot about NPS.
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You could say that even rising NPS is a part of that.
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Now how does that happen?
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So imagine a world where you have a monopoly over giving out banking.
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And today, about almost 70% of the banking business is done by public sector banks.
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In many areas, they are the only banks operating.
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So if you want a loan, you have to go to that neighborhood bank, which is owned by the government.
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And the guy sitting there at the head of the table who has to sign your loan and award
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that loan to you has this arbitrary power and you can't turn to someone else.
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The local money lender you will go to will probably charge you 40% or maybe even more.
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So you know that in this case, you are stuck with that.
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So what this does is, well, this becomes a case of corruption then.
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So the arbitrary power, which is now lies in the hands of a monopoly in a way which
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has been existed for a long time and the incentives, the way we discussed.
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So this, in a way, breeds corruption.
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It becomes a breeding ground for corruption.
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Outside of that, it becomes, think about when we were talking about NPAs, a direct and obvious
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consequence of all this is higher NPAs, there's no need to, or incentive for the PSB employee
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to do a thorough check of a prospective borrower.
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So if I go and want a loan for about a crore rupees to buy a house from ICC bank, the guy
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who is going to award me that loan is going to be very thorough with this.
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But if he's going to look into my credit history, whether I have paid back loans in the past
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on time or not, now there are agencies which are doing this kind of reporting and background
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But not necessarily those kinds of incentives exist for a public sector bank.
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And therefore you will see that the NPAs for the public sector bank are almost always higher
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than for those for private sector banks.
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In fact, the opposite incentives exist because often if powerful politicians say, they don't
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really have an option but to agree.
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The columnist Vivek Kaul wrote an interesting piece on the site that I added, I think pragati.com,
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the name of the piece is called the separation of knowledge and power.
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And he gave some great figures in there, now consider these.
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In the SBI, their bad loans ratio of the bank when it came to home loans was 0.43%.
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When it came to auto loans, it was 0.65%.
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For overall retail loans, it was 0.55%.
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But Vivek's piece reveals, for large corporates, it's 9.67%.
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For mid-corporates, it's 19.35%.
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For small and medium enterprises, it's 7.04%, which means 10 to 20 times as much as for
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auto loans or retail loans and far, far more than the NPAs of private sector banks.
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And the reason for this is essentially that politician tells you, ki bhai isko do, you
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have to and you don't, like another interesting figure he points out is he refers to a specific
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loan where a public sector bank gave a loan at a debt to equity ratio of 14.6 to 1.
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While no private sector bank will ever give a similar loan at a debt to equity ratio
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And this is 14.6 to 1, the specific loan that he talks about, which is obviously political
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pressure and is deeply irresponsible.
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And that is why we have such a massive NPA problem in the country today.
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This also brings me to another unseen effect of the ownership of government banks is that
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it creates an uneven playing field in the market.
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So there is sort of sovereign guarantee which lies behind all these public sector banks,
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which have been created by an almost act of parliament.
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So you won't see even their name appear in the other public sector enterprises.
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So there is a sovereign guarantee which these public sector banks enjoy, which a private
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sector bank does not enjoy.
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So a public sector bank can never go bust, that means, because they have the taxpayers
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always standing behind to bail them out.
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So essentially if a public sector bank gives a loan to someone for 70,000 crores and that
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person defaults, hey, no sweat, because the taxpayer pays for it, right?
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Whereas with the private sector bank, the taxpayer doesn't pay for it, the bank can
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It's the bank's responsibility and therefore the incentives are much better within the
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organization to prevent that kind of occurrence.
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And this prevents from a robust market to develop for banking because it depresses the
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private sector bank's competitiveness to compete.
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And even then you will find that our private sector banks have done it excellently well
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by grabbing almost more than 30% of the market share from the time they were allowed to come
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in and start being in the business with banking.
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So there's an argument that the counterfactual is that the banking sector would be far more
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developed if public sector banks simply didn't exist.
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Because what public sector banks also do, as you pointed out in our conversation with
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me earlier, is that they create an uneven playing field which stops private sector banks
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Then there are some of the other unseen effects of public sector banks are that it depresses
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the growth in the economy.
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So when the flow of credit is determined arbitrarily by the government or bureaucrat and not by
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the profitability or viability of a business, what happens then?
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More often than not, the hard-earned savings which a banking institution is supposed to
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channelize into other productive users now gets channelized into non-productive users.
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That's why the higher-end PAs and et cetera, et cetera.
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So you see that the otherwise growth of the economy would have been much higher than what
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we see now, which also causes less jobs to be created and other-
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Exactly, so in a proper free market where failing companies are allowed to fail and
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where everything adjusts for supply and demand, the money would go where the money is needed
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And that is something that government, with its fatal conceit of central planning, simply
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Then another unseen effect is the damage it does to the fiscal consolidation.
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So we have something called the FRBM Act, Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
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Act where the government of India has put a constraint on itself saying that we will
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abide by these rules and not spend more than, say, a certain amount of money, in this case
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being more than 3% of GDP as fiscal deficit, so they won't cross that.
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But from the time of financial crisis, they have always been breaching that number.
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They have never gotten back to it.
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And sovereign credit rating agencies, when they come and rate India, they have always
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reprimanded, in a way, the government saying that, you know, you guys have been very profligate,
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particularly when it comes to banking, and not being able to control your MPs.
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And therefore, it prevents India from getting a good rating.
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And when you don't get a good rating, that means the price, the cost of borrowing for
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the entire economy goes up.
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So any businessmen, when they go out of India, try to borrow money, you know, the cost of
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And similarly for India itself, the sovereign bonds that the government of India will issue,
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it will be able to raise funds at a higher rate from foreign borrowers.
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So the ripple effects, so the ripple effects of that essentially go far, far beyond the
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taxes that we pay, or taxpayers money going into capitalizing these banks, or going to
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the whole economy being curtailed as a result of all of this.
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You mentioned the financial crisis.
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So I want to ask you a question here, which, you know, a lot of people speaking in favor
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of public sector banks often say that, look, we didn't suffer so badly from the 2008 financial
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crisis because so much of our banking was public sector, and blah, blah, blah, and this
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is the way the system is.
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What's your response to that?
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You know, so imagine a guy who is living in a jungle of, say, central India in somewhere
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in it could be Chhattisgarh or Jharkhand, you know, when the crisis hit, he was not
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The same analogy can be used for India.
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So if you are not integrated with the world economy, and a crisis is hit, and if you don't
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say that, you know, I didn't get hurt because I was able to regulate my banking system very
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well, it's not a very good argument to make, you know, because you also lost quite a lot.
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Had you been integrated into the global economy, you would have been able to have access to
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these sources of finance, you would have been able to make kind of investments which you
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were never able to do, et cetera, et cetera.
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So the opportunity cost is very high that way.
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In other words, what you're saying is that if you were integrated into the world economy,
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the gains from that would have been so much over the years that even if we suffered more
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in percentage loss terms, because of the financial crisis, we would still overall be far better
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I mean, look at just the per capita income of the countries which suffered and per capita
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income of India, they are even after the crisis, they are much better off than we are today.
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So in a sense, it's not a feature, it's a bug.
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You could say that, yeah.
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But I'll also say that public sector banks are not exactly completely the culprits here.
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In a way, they are also victims.
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Let me explain that a bit.
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So public sector banks have to go through dual regulation, you know.
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So on the one hand, RBI regulates them like every other commercial bank, private banks,
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while Ministry of Finance also regulates them.
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Number two is that the poor pay compared to a private sector bank, so which we have discussed
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briefly in the beginning, that there is no way because of these written rules and which
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cannot be changed without permission from say Ministry of Finance or a finance minister
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or somewhere at that level, you cannot get good talent through which you can probably
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Then there is external vigilance enforcement through Chief Vigilance Commissioner or CBI,
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which are mandated to look into the workings and the dealings of public sector bank.
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In certain cases, public sector banks are also open to RTI inquiries.
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So what happens is that the incentive that the banker has, knowing that he is going to
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be publicly scrutinized from all these various agencies, is to play a little more safe and
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not trying to take kind of risks that otherwise a private banker would do and therefore increase.
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And these are some of the reasons probably through which a public sector bank should
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be on par and play with a private sector bank.
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It should be freed up basically and try and let them operate like a private sector bank
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and that can happen through making them, like privatizing them.
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So in a sense, this is like the flip side of the NPA problem.
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The NPA problem is that you are forced by political pressure to give out loans to people
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which you know are bad loans that are never coming back.
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And the flip side of that is that when it comes to giving out loans, because you know
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that every action of yours will be scrutinized, you are inclined and incentivized indeed to
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just play it completely safe.
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And whereas with a private sector bank, there's a healthy amount of risk that you have to
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take on with due diligence, of course, which public sector bank employees, because they're
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not being rated on performance per se, just want to cover their asses, except when order
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Kumar, it's been a pleasure having you on the show.
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And that's all we have for today.
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I'll see you next week.
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But if you just can't resist having more of me, you can follow me on Twitter at Amit Varma.
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That's A-M-I-T-V-A-R-M-A.
#
You can also head on over to my blog, India Uncut at indiancut.com.
#
And if you want to binge listen to past episodes of the scene and the unseen, and who can blame
#
you for that, head on over to sceneunseen.in.
#
If you enjoyed listening to the scene and the unseen, check out another hit show from
#
Indusworks media networks, Cyrus Says, which is hosted by my old colleague from MTV, Cyrus
#
You can download it on any podcasting network.
#
There's scene unseen, podcast, on course, Cyrus Says, Marry in India, rediscovery project,
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empowering series, sex wax, IVM likes, simplified, keeping it queer, Tings and Destinations,
#
My Neighbor Zuckerberg, and The Fan Garage.
#
Uh, can you repeat that?
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Go to ivmpodcast.com and listen to all of this, or download their app.
