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Did you know that Parsis in Mumbai, instead of being left at the Tower of Silence after
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they die, are now cremated?
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Because a cow fell sick in the early 1990s.
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Did you know that the smog in Delhi is caused by something that farmers in Punjab do, and
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that there's no way to stop them?
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Did you know that there wasn't one gas tragedy in Bhopal, but three?
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One of them was seen, but two were unseen.
#
Did you know that many well-intentioned government policies hurt the people they're supposed
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Why was demonetization a bad idea?
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How should GST have been implemented?
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Why are all our politicians so corrupt when not all of them are bad people?
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I'm Amit Verma, and in my weekly podcast, The Seen and the Unseen, I take a shot at
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answering all these questions and many more.
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I aim to go beyond the seen and show you the unseen effects of public policy and private
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I speak to experts on economics, political philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and constitutional
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law, so that their insights can blow not only my mind, but also yours.
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The Seen and the Unseen releases every Monday, so do check out the archives and follow the
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You can also subscribe to The Seen and the Unseen on whatever podcast app you happen
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And now let's move on to the show.
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People often talk of India and Pakistan as estranged siblings.
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After all, we're culturally so similar, if not basically the same, in terms of language,
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cuisine, dress, cricket, and even our taste for bad escapist cinema.
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I'd actually go further and argue that we're more than siblings.
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We're joined at the hip almost literally, bound not just by culture, but also by geography,
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and therefore geopolitics.
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And for this reason, everything that happens in Pakistan concerns us also.
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We can't afford to just ignore it.
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And elections in Pakistan are more important for us than elections in any other country.
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Welcome to The Seen and the Unseen, our weekly podcast on economics, politics, and behavioral
#
Please welcome your host, Amit Padma.
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Welcome to The Seen and the Unseen.
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Today's topic is the Pakistan elections of July 25th.
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Now this conversation took place on July 23rd before the elections, and you're listening
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to it on the Monday after.
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But that's okay, because what we discussed was not the specific result of these specific
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elections, but the state of Pakistani democracy and what is at stake here.
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My guests today are my colleagues at the online magazine I edit, Pragati, at thinkpragati.com.
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Pranay Kotasane is our editor for Foreign Affairs, as well as a fellow at the Takshashila
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Institution in Bangalore, and one of the most highly regarded foreign policy analysts in
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Hamsini Hariharan is the assistant editor of Pragati, and foreign policy is also one
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Before we begin the conversation though, here's a quick commercial break.
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If this happens to be the only podcast you listen to, well, you need to listen to some
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Check out the ones from IVM Podcasts who co-produced the show with me.
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Go to ivmpodcasts.com or download the IVM app, and you'll find a host of great Indian
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podcasts that cover every subject you could think of.
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From the magazine I edit, Pragati, at thinkpragati.com, there is the Pragati Podcast, hosted by Hamsini
#
Hariharan and Pawan Srinath.
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There is a brilliant Hindi podcast, Puli Abazi, hosted by Pranay Kotasane and Saurabh Chandra.
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So download the IVM Podcasts app today.
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Pranay Hamsini, welcome to The Scene in the Unseen.
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Thanks Amit, great to be back.
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Yeah, thanks for having us.
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So now we are recording this on the 23rd of July and the 25th are obviously the elections
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So what I wanted this episode to be about is not so much what the outcome will be because
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it will be known by the time you listen to it, but we don't know it yet, but more about
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what is the landscape of politics and electoral politics in Pakistan and how it's kind of
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So Pranay, just give me sort of a quick update, like I'm speaking purely from a layman's perspective.
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What is Pakistani democracy?
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The Pakistani democracy is quite elusive, actually.
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And that's being perplexing for many of the people around.
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And the way we've tried to characterize it is that Pakistan is actually not one geopolitical
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entity, but two of them.
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One is the putative state of Pakistan, which actually has its flag, a PM, a PM's car and
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all that paraphernalia with it.
#
But the more important one is something what we call the military jihadi complex.
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Now, the way we define it is that it is a dynamic syndicate of the military militants,
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the jihadists, the radicalists and political economic structures, which basically have
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their own foreign policy and domestic policies.
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And they try to assert their relative dominance over this entire thing called Pakistan.
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So it is this MJC or the military jihadi complex, which actually is in control of the corridors
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And it is the one which determines what will happen.
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And even in this election, if you see it, the most important opinion that matters is
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not the one that comes out of opinion polls, but the opinion of the military.
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And the military seems to have made its choice.
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So what's really the history of this military jihadi complex?
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Like it hasn't always existed, I'm assuming.
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But at the same time, like, would you say that the dominance of the military was something
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written in the DNA of the Pakistan state in terms of how it was formed?
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Actually, it has been existing since the emergence of Pakistan.
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And in fact, there is a great book by Steve Wilkinson called Army and the Nation.
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And it tries to lay out a comparison between the history of the Indian army and the history
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of Pakistani army and why both of them diverge in terms of the political roles that armies
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And it's a fascinating account of that.
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And the military jihadi complex has its root right from the emergence of Pakistan.
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There have been several constitutions that Pakistan has had, several stages where the
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military was in direct control of the government.
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And even now, even though there is something called a Pakistani PM, do you know who's the
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Pakistani PM now, for example?
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Give me a minute while I Google it.
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I think you might know the PM of some other neighboring state.
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Let's say Maldives, you would know who is right.
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But in Pakistan, it's difficult because the current guy who's been installed is someone
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who's not even a big guy in his own political party.
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He was only installed because Nawaz Sharif sort of confronted the Pakistani military
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and the military jihadi complex thought that he was getting too big for his shoes and hence
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So if I have to say, what are the broad trends that have taken place over the last few years?
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Let's look at it first from a foreign policy angle of Pakistan.
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One, the narrative that the MJC has been selling all these years, that they are the protectors
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of Pakistan and the world would be worse off if they weren't there.
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That kind of narrative has weakened over the last few years.
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The Americans who are backing the Pakistani military just because they thought there was
#
no better option, they chose to believe so, are also frustrated with it.
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So if you see over the last few years, the aid that Pakistan army got has significantly
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So from a foreign policy angle, there is a pressure.
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The amount of options that Pakistani army had have reduced now.
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In the domestic side, what you saw was last time Nawaz Sharif, his party called the Pakistan
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Muslim League, Nawaz, won a landslide elections.
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They won around 178 seats out of 342.
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And it was the first time when a democratic transition actually took place from one democratic
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party to the other big, big event right after 70 years.
#
And even though that happened, after that Nawaz Sharif sort of did a lot of things to
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change Pakistan and most importantly, and where the Pakistani military didn't like it
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is where he started questioning the ISI, et cetera, on what they have been doing in regulating
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And this came out as a leaked report in a famous newspaper called Dawn.
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And that's when the Pakistani military started to go behind him.
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And hence he was overthrown and he was forced to exit.
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There was a nonentity was made the PM.
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So these are the two things.
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The third one is what is happening on the Pakistani border with Afghanistan, which I
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guess Hamsini can tell you better.
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Something that I wanted to talk about was the rise of the Pashtun Taifu movement.
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So what's been happening is that since 2015, there's been supposedly a crackdown on the
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And so the Pakistan army launched something called Operation Zarb-e-Azab.
#
And this meant that a lot of people who were in the area were arbitrarily detained and harassed
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And this is not new also in the federally administrated tribal areas of FATA, which
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comes under, it doesn't come under the Pakistani constitution.
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So what happened is from 2015, there have been small protests.
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Just to correct it, it does come under the Pakistani constitution, but the laws which
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apply to these people are different from the laws that apply to the other Pakistanis.
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So there is something called the FCR and their draconian laws.
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For example, one person doesn't have one vote in those areas, whereas the other Pakistanis
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Here there is something called a community vote, things like that, really crazy colonial
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stuff which still continues to this day.
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And another thing is if you do something, then members of your family will be detained
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So they are really draconian laws.
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So what's happened over the last year is that this movement started calling for dignity
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for the rights of Pashtuns.
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And it's the first grassroots movement in recent history in Pakistan that's managed
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to affect an outcome that the Pakistan army was not really favorable to.
#
So one of the things that they were able to do about a month ago was merge two provinces
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in Pakistan, Khyber Pakhtunva and FATA.
#
And this has been a demand for a very long time so that there would be better governance
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But this is the first time that the change has actually been mandated.
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And this goes on to show that there is a lot of dissatisfaction on the ground.
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The people aren't really happy with the way that the civilian government has been acting
#
simply because the civilian government does not have a lot of power.
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And correct me if I'm wrong, but one sense in which this uprising is different from past
#
uprisings is that past uprisings focused to a certain extent on identity politics, on
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Pashtuns versus the rest and so on, while this was really focused strongly on individual
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rights and on just being treated as citizens and so on.
#
Is that a correct formulation?
#
No, I would suggest it is still largely it is being seen as a Pashtun movement itself.
#
The word itself means Pashtun protection movement.
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But are they agitating for the same sort of things they were in the past?
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Yeah, it's not that they are arguing for a Pashtunistan or anything like that.
#
They are arguing for Pashtuns to have the same rights that other Pakistanis have, essentially
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And the unique thing about this is that the leadership is not affiliated with any political
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So it's tough for the Pakistani army to curb it.
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And they have immense amount of instruments to curb it, right?
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And the military complex excels in that they can manufacture charges, get force disappearances.
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It's a very famous term in Pakistan, which gets used called Namalu Mafrads.
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These are unidentified persons, they emerge out of nowhere and they'll just abduct you.
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Very, very common happened to a lot of Pashtuns.
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And in fact, that is why this entire movement started.
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And the leader of this, for example, is a guy called Manzoor Pashtin.
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He's a young chap, has no political history.
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But he went around Fata and there was a march, a lot of people joined him on the way.
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So it's what Hamsini said a grassroots movement, which really caught on and the Pakistani army
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Yeah, and what the movement has done differently from other movements, as Pranay said, is that
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it didn't take up any political affiliations, even at the end of it after the two provinces
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And a lot of people were saying, you know, what next for the movement?
#
The leaders of the movement were saying maybe individuals will take up political contest
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if they want to, but the movement as such is not going to back anyone.
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And while it was happening, it was suddenly seen as, you know, an important vote that
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they had never counted before on, because traditionally Pashtun votes go to the PTI
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that works, the Pakistan Tehri Ki INSA that is in Khyber Pakhtunva.
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So this was seen as a new demographic that has never come to the fore before in Pakistan.
#
And just sort of going back to the first point you made, Pranay, about the army no longer,
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the military jihadi complex been weakened over the last few years.
#
And I remember in the early 2000s, before 9-11, Pakistan was economically pretty much
#
on the verge of collapse and someone like I visited Pakistan to cover the Indian cricket
#
tour of 2006 and I'd also written for the World Street Journal and so on in that time.
#
And I remember someone at that point telling me that we think of, we don't call Al-Qaeda
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Al-Qaeda, we call it Al-Faida, because what happened with that was that the army suddenly
#
got a spurt of validation and it could justify itself in much stronger times, in much stronger
#
terms and a lot of funds poured in from abroad because you obviously looked at Pakistan as
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a key ally in the war against terror and the military jihadi complex just grew stronger.
#
Now one reason for the military jihadi complex growing weaker obviously is that the West
#
has figured out that these guys are not allies, they are playing a double game.
#
But is it also the case that even domestically people are more empowered or more disillusioned
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Is it like a two-way thing happening here?
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Yes, that's true for some section because look at it like this, so Pakistani military
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jihadi complex, everyone now knows that they are the ones who are in the driver's seat.
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And in spite of them being in the driver's seat, things haven't changed a lot, right?
#
And in fact, the gap between India and Pakistan has also been widened significantly.
#
So in the sense, there is this disillusionment that whatever we were promised and the military
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being the protectors of the ideological frontiers have not delivered.
#
So there is that sense of alienation which has come in.
#
But because the military jihadi complex is still the most powerful formation, it can,
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you know, there are these, for example, every year there are these surveys which keep getting
#
held everywhere and still Pakistani army get some 75% ratings in the most trusted institution
#
of Pakistan and all that.
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So that kind of continues.
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But I guess, yes, there has been some disillusionment that we aren't getting what we are.
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Most recent example, actually, like just yesterday, there have been street protests in Punjab.
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People saying ISI, Murdabad and all that.
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It's very, very rare for it to happen in Punjab.
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Second, what has also changed the fact is that there have been terrorist attacks in
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the heartland of Punjab over the last few years.
#
So that again has set the question back in the army's court that what happened?
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You were the guys who were going to protect us against India and against all the terrorists.
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But now even the gardens of, you know, there was an attack in a park in Punjab, in Lahore.
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So even those places aren't safe anymore.
#
So that has sort of weakened domestically.
#
And would it be your case that, you know, when Indians typically think of Pakistan as
#
an enemy nation, what they're actually thinking of is a military jihadi complex and not so
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much the, you know, like Pakistan civil society at this point seems fairly fed up themselves
#
of the military jihadi complex.
#
No, that's a very good point, actually.
#
That's why I was trying to say that look at Pakistan as two entities.
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There is this one entity which you can't probably, you know, sort of get you on your side because
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they have defined their existence as opposing you and that's a military jihadi complex.
#
So maybe the long term solution for that entity is just that we need to resist it for now
#
and hope that we dismantle it in the future or it gets dismantled on its own.
#
But the other side is not inherently inimical to India or might not be so, at least it can
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An evidence for that is like what you see happening in a Kashmir, for example, over
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the last two, three years, Pakistan could have done a lot more if it wanted to.
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And it's my sort of assertion that actually they haven't done a lot and a lot of problems
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which are of the recent times are our own problems and the way we've handled Kashmir
#
But Pakistan has been a peripheral player in this, but it's not been the main person which
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is doing things from behind, which was the case a few years back.
#
But your case is if they wanted to, they could have.
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They could have and they didn't.
#
They didn't because as you see last few years, Nawaz Sharif was the one who was trying to
#
assert himself politically and there were some overtures on both sides and they sort
#
of tried to figure it out that, you know, maybe we need to get our acts in the domestic
#
sphere first together and then see what we have to do with India.
#
So there was and remember the terrorism increased significantly within Pakistan, right?
#
So there was backlash internally as well.
#
If Punjab is getting bombed internally, they said, how can we support terrorism elsewhere?
#
So this entire narrative of Pakistan having backing terrorist elements sort of had weakened
#
over the last few years, right?
#
And do you think that this is one of the reasons Nawaz Sharif also faced pushback from the
#
army that he was trying to control terrorism and didn't let the terrorists affect what
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Yeah, in fact, he was questioning those guys and that's what the report in Dawn said and
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that was a bit too much to ask.
#
And that's why what happened and he was declared that he was not Sadik and Ameen, right?
#
So, yeah, what is a Sadik and Ameen?
#
You told me before you began recording, but for the benefit of the listeners, so it's
#
fascinating Pakistan as so current constitution, which is in force in Pakistan was the one
#
And after that, an article was inserted in Zia ul Haq's time, an article 62, which said
#
that a person who is elected to the Legislative Assembly, he should have adequate knowledge
#
of Islamic teachings and practices and the obligatory duties prescribed by Islam, and
#
he should abstain from major sins.
#
And the clause also said that candidate should be Sadik and Ameen, so it means honest and
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Now you can understand how vague this is.
#
So the Pakistani military complex often uses this clause to just take people out, which
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And the way they do now is very intelligent.
#
Earlier, like back until the 1990s, they could just overthrow the political outfits and the
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army guys could become the president and military martial law administrators like what Parvez
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Musharraf Zia ul Haq and all those guys did.
#
But now there will be a backlash internationally, even within Pakistan, right?
#
So what they do is more intelligent things, more sophisticated things, they get the judiciary
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So the judiciary will say that, okay, Nawaz Sharif has been involved in Panama paper leaks
#
and he is no longer Sadik and Ameen, so he should be thrown off.
#
And then you have this entire set of another guy coming in who the Pakistani army wants.
#
Which is quite marvelous.
#
Yeah, in fact, that's why the recent dismissal of Nawaz Sharif and his putting an arrest
#
out for him for 10 years, he's supposed to be jailed.
#
It was called judicial coup because that's what it was.
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It was orchestrated by the Pakistan army.
#
So the army basically controls the judiciary and uses it as a tool when it wants to.
#
So you know, I want to ask you guys about the current elections.
#
But before I do that, a slightly deeper question going back to the background that you were
#
giving me before the start of the episode about the army's predominant role in Pakistani
#
politics, which is so different from the army's role in India, and thank goodness for that.
#
And can you give me a TLDR of how the Pakistani army, the military jihadi complex, as it has
#
become now, became dominant in Pakistan politics right from 47?
#
And if that is a structural reason, then why should it change now?
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I mean, is there any hope of it ever changing?
#
Yeah, the structural reason for the Pakistan army's dominance was now Pakistan was born
#
a very insecure state, right, and it always perceived it so.
#
So for the first few years, the biggest chunk of their budgetary allocation was in defense
#
So in a sense, it was the army and the armed forces which got a head start over the other
#
institutions and in a fragile state, which was just beginning, it was only the army which
#
sort of seemed to work right.
#
And remember, during the British times as well, they had allocated big canal colonies
#
along the Indus and given it to the military guys, etc.
#
So these were also the people who were the richer ones, the well-educated ones.
#
And now also more important from a public finance point of view.
#
So these people had a head start and that sort of they then you had the first coup which
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came up and you had Ayub Khan taking over the reins.
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So it was born that way, you know, and that sort of has continued.
#
The army has never allowed the other putative state to actually emerge.
#
And was it like, as in our case, was there ever a sort of constitution which tried to
#
lay down the rules of the game or how did that go?
#
Yeah, the often the constitution was made by the army guys itself after they ruled,
#
they had a new constitution, it changed, etc.
#
So it always tried to give a veneer of democracy to and a legitimacy which you would find acceptable,
#
but always there, it was clear where the power center lay.
#
And to your question of whether it will change or not, the only thing sort of which can change
#
is if this Pakistani military jihadi complex is no longer seen as the one which can deliver
#
the goods for the Pakistanis.
#
And I guess, at least the trend is now in a direction where Pakistanis themselves are
#
questioning where we are going with what we've done.
#
And you know, the countries around Pakistan have managed to do much better things.
#
So they are questioning that.
#
And that's why you are seeing a lot of this civil unrest with the PTM, etc, which is coming
#
And therein lies the hope, I guess.
#
In fact, this is why I keep saying that, you know, just because we view Pakistan as the
#
enemy, which as you correctly pointed out, there are two aspects of Pakistan and the
#
military jihadi complex as enemy, just because of that, we shouldn't cut down on trade with
#
In fact, if anything, we should expand free trade with them, we should expand person to
#
person relations, because all of those things will only strengthen Pakistani civil society
#
vis-a-vis the military jihadi complex.
#
So that is sort of another front in the battle we have to fight against.
#
But I would say, I have a slightly different take to it.
#
At least we shouldn't think of all these big overtures, you know, a PM meeting a PM and
#
all that, because the past evidence shows that whenever such big jumblas take place,
#
immediately after that, the military jihadi complex strikes back, there is instance after
#
instance where this has happened.
#
So it's better to not, you know, insert a finger into the eyes of the MJC by doing these
#
Yeah, you could do it at a first start with back channel talks, NSA's to NSA's and then
#
slowly open people to people contacts, but anything which is big, which questions the
#
military jihadi complex, you know, the foundation of that is that they are going to protect
#
So if you start to question that, then MJC strikes back.
#
So like the MJC, maybe what you're saying is MJC may be wounded and insecure, but they're
#
still the biggest beast in the room and you don't want to roll them up too much.
#
We'll shift to talking about the current elections, which I find hopelessly complicated and hard
#
to understand right after a brief commercial break.
#
Hey, it's been another great week on IVM, if you aren't following us on social media,
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We're IVM podcasts on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.
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On Cyrus says this week, we have Satyanshu Singh, filmmaker, writer and head of content
#
development for AIB first draft.
#
His journey from doctor to writer is a fascinating one.
#
On the scene and the unseen, Amit is joined by Pranay Kotastane and Hamzani to decode
#
Pakistan's experiences with democracy.
#
On Keeping it Queer this week, Naveen speaks to Parmesh Sahani, author and head of the
#
Godrej India Culture Lab.
#
Hustle Science marks the season finale with fitness YouTuber Abhinav Mahajan and on Geek
#
Fruit, Tejas and Jishnu give you the greatest hits from this year's Dandy O Comic Con.
#
It's time for you to catch the third story from Crock Tales with Anand Sivakumaran.
#
This one is called Freddy Ki Fiat Ho Gayi Flat.
#
And now onto your show.
#
Pranay and Hamzani, welcome back to the scene and the unseen.
#
So help me make sense of what's happening in these elections.
#
You had Nawaz Sharif sort of being defined against the military jihadist complex, which
#
is on the downswing, both in terms of what the world thinks of it and in terms of dealing
#
So they've used the Supreme Court as a puppet to get Nawaz out of the way.
#
They've installed a puppet prime minister and now you have elections coming up.
#
Who are the players in this game and what's likely to happen?
#
Before we get into these elections, I think it'll be good if Pranay you told us how the
#
National Assembly elections in Pakistan actually work, right?
#
With respect to vote shares in provinces and so on.
#
So think of it this way, that the electoral seats, basically Pakistan is dominated by
#
So the total number of seats in the assembly are 342.
#
Not all of them go for elections.
#
They are sort of some of them are reserved seats, etc.
#
For minorities and women.
#
Yeah, minorities and women.
#
So around 270 will go to vote in these elections.
#
Now the Punjab dominance is that nearly 170 seats out of 342 belong to Punjab.
#
So the second highest state, which is Sindh, it is less than half of that number.
#
So anyone who controls Punjab sort of is the big person in town.
#
In the last elections now, Nawaz Sharif's party really swept the entire Punjab, okay.
#
And they had close to 178 seats or something like that.
#
So because of that, they were the big party there.
#
Now what's happening now?
#
Because PMLN has now lost favor of the Pakistani military jihadi complex, there are some other
#
formations who are coming up.
#
Now there is something called the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf, which is led by Imran Khan
#
and his election symbol obviously is a cricket bat.
#
I don't know why not a ball, but it's a cricket bat.
#
So Imran Khan is the, his party actually rules this thing called the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which
#
That state just has now 50 seats totally.
#
These are the two big formations.
#
The third formation is the Pakistani People's Party, which is Benazir Bhutto's party.
#
Now it is being led by her son.
#
Now over the time PPP's influence has waned.
#
And even in these elections, it is only restricted to sins that they might perform well.
#
These are the three big parties.
#
Some other parties are now Pakistani military jihadi complex also trying to mainstream militants.
#
So there is always like a palimpsest of militants who keep coming into the electoral set up.
#
Earlier you had some jihadi elements.
#
Now you have these guys Hafiz Saeed has a party called the Millimuslim League that might
#
And they are backed by the military jihadi complex.
#
It is a part of the military jihadi, they are the jihadi part of the military jihadi.
#
So it is very clear they are trying to mainstream it.
#
There are militant Barelvi outfits also, there is a Pakistani Labaik party and they are also
#
So there are many many layers of these militant guys who are also sort of contesting.
#
So these are the main guys in the elections.
#
Now Pakistani army has made its choice.
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It looks like Imran Khan is their man and a few reasons for that.
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First they hated the PMLN and Nawaz Sharif and even though Nawaz Sharif won't be contesting
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elections they fear that his family will still be in control and he might again come back.
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So they are trying to restrict them.
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They are doing that in a few ways.
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One they are obviously helping Imran Khan project his party's name everywhere.
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Second they have split the Pakistani Muslim League itself and there was this interior
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minister Nisar Chaudhary who was from the Nawaz Sharif faction.
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Now he split from the PMLN and he is contesting elections alone and he was allotted the symbol
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of a jeep which very obviously evokes images of the Pakistani military itself and not only
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did that happen a lot of people started quitting PMLN and by some strange luck lot of these
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independents have been given the jeep symbol.
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So this is the jeep party which is sort of... they don't call themselves a party by the
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They are saying we are not a group but we know what it is.
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What might happen is because PTI does not have great presence in Punjab these jeepers
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plus the PTI might collaborate and you might have a formation which can run.
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And also Imran in the past has sort of shown his sympathy for militants anyway and so he
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has always sort of been wanting to get into the good books of the Military Jihadi complex.
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The party was started by...
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Now the interesting thing is even Nawaz Sharif's party was bankrolled by the Pakistani army
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back in the 80s when Benzir Bhutto was just rising.
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So as a counterpoint to that.
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Also there was this formation called the IJI which was formed and Nawaz Sharif was a businessman
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who was brought in to do this.
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But over time Nawaz Sharif now with 30 years of politics behind him wanted to do things
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his own way and that was too much for the Pakistani army.
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So now you have another case here and they are trying to form this party called the PTI.
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Obviously they emerge, they come up every time the Pakistani army wants them to do,
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wants them to create all these noises.
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So yes it looks like they are the Pakistani army's guys.
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So is the army also going to rig the elections in a manner of speaking because there is an
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army person at every booth for example.
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They are pretty much controlling the physical logistics.
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So that's the interesting thing and I don't know how that would work out.
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My guess is they have already rigged the elections.
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You don't need to rig the ballot process to rig an election.
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They have just put Nawaz Sharif behind bars, put his daughter behind bars.
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So if that is not rigging what is?
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You face so many insurmountable difficulties.
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And I think you won't want to rig the election anymore because the army still wants that
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veneer of credibility, right, at some point they still, they've always maintained the
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prop of a civilian government to show that there is some aspect of democracy within Pakistan.
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So if they go any further then I think they will be tipping that balance and they won't
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want to do that necessarily because then they can go back to military rule.
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But does that matter anymore because everyone in the international community for example
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knows the real score anyway, right?
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No, I think it does matter because recently Pakistan has been put on the FATF, right,
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The grey list of the financial action.
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For not cracking down on terrorism and money laundry and things like that.
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And I don't know, what do you think Pranay?
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I think the difference this time is because Nawaz Sharif is extremely popular still.
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And in fact, after what the army has done to him and put him behind jail, etc., there's
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a greater sympathy wave for him as well.
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So he's no walkover either, he's a seasoned politician.
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So if the Pakistan army goes overboard, there might be a pushback from the supporters of
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Nawaz Sharif, which didn't exist earlier because there was only one game in town earlier.
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But now there is at least a hint of some political opposition.
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But is there space for such a backlash to express itself?
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I mean, if it's basically an army-run country, they can just clamp down on any dissent, right?
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Yeah, that might well happen.
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And in fact, that's what is happening, but for example, there were a lot of protests
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in favor of Nawaz Sharif as well.
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And you know, voices were raised even after he was removed because of this clause.
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So in a sense, they won't be able to keep it under wraps if this happens.
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So there will be some fallout, there will be protests, which I don't know whether they
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are ready to take that challenge up.
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And he was debarred from government, right, he did a long march from Islamabad to Lahore,
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right, saying, you know, yes, I've been debarred from office, but I still have clout.
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And similarly, when the judgment now that sentenced him to 10 years of prison was out,
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he and his daughter were actually in London, and protesters stormed through the apartment
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and eventually he chose to come back to Pakistan, even though he knew he was facing arrest.
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And I think these are all symbolic of the fact that the Sharifs know that there is a
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sympathy wave for them that they will command it in that sense.
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Which is kind of ironic given that they were once cronies themselves in a sense of the
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army, like you pointed out.
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But you know, once you have power, I guess the logic of power works differently.
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And I think he probably thought that he can do more things on his term rather.
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Power changes everybody.
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I mean, power is like the most fascinating subject of modern times, how it can just...
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There is this famous quote from the Harry Potter, right, when Voldemort in the first
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book says, there is only power in those who are too weak to seek it.
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And I think that's a great way to explain what is happening in Pakistani politics.
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A profound geopolitical insight from someone who lost.
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Times do change and power does shift.
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So okay, so here's the million dollar question then.
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All this is happening in Pakistan, the military jihadi complex is asserting itself and Imran
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might, interestingly our listeners will know this as they are listening to the podcast,
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though we don't at the time of speaking, Imran might come to power or whatever happens.
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What are the repercussions for India?
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So from the Indian angle, these elections don't really matter.
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They are all interesting for us to observe, but still what we are seeing is the military
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jihadi complex, we have to face that particular side of the equation.
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And there will be someone who will be a crony of the military jihadi complex.
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Earlier you at least had some guy who could question the military jihadi complex in a
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limited sense, but yes, there was, now we will end up with a situation where there is
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a military jihadi complex and the political part is just going to relay whatever they
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So we have no other option but to try to see how this military jihadi complex's role can
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be managed and that's what we are left with pretty much.
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And what is Imran's attitude towards India in terms of his public utterances and so on?
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Extremely antagonistic towards India.
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In fact, his favorite criticism of any of his political opponents is they are India
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supporters or they did something which was in India's interests or something.
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And everyone for them is a raw agent.
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So that's the standard thing with PTI, it won't change.
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We are also no doubt raw agents Pranay and Hamsini, thanks a lot for coming on the podcast.
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It's been very illuminating talking to you.
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If you enjoyed listening to this episode, do follow Hamsini on Twitter at HamsiniH and
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follow Pranay at PranayKotas.
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You can also follow me at Amit Verma, A-M-I-T-V-A-R-M-A.
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You can browse past episodes of The Scene and the Unseen at sceneunseen.in.
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Thank you for listening.
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some of the super achievers have hacked their way to success and they have done spectacular
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Episodes out fortnightly on Wednesdays on the IVM website, app or your favorite podcasting
