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Did you know that Parsi's in Mumbai, instead of being left at the Tower of Silence after
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they die, are now cremated?
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Because a cow fell sick in the early 1990s.
#
Did you know that the smog in Delhi is caused by something that farmers in Punjab do and
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that there's no way to stop them?
#
Did you know that there wasn't one gas tragedy in Bhopal, but three?
#
One of them was seen, but two were unseen.
#
Did you know that many well-intentioned government policies hurt the people they're supposed
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Why was demonetization a bad idea?
#
How should GST have been implemented?
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Why are all our politicians so corrupt when not all of them are bad people?
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I'm Amit Verma, and in my weekly podcast, The Seen and the Unseen, I take a shot at
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answering all these questions and many more.
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I aim to go beyond the seen and show you the unseen effects of public policy and private
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I speak to experts on economics, political philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and constitutional
#
law so that their insights can blow not only my mind, but also yours.
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The Seen and the Unseen releases every Monday.
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So do check out the archives and follow the show at seenunseen.in.
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You can also subscribe to The Seen and the Unseen on whatever podcast app you happen
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And now let's move on to the show.
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For a species continuously at war with itself, what does it mean to have nuclear weapons?
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Is there going to be more war?
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Or because these weapons are so deadly, is there going to be less war?
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If no one will mess with someone who has nuclear weapons, does it mean that the smallest country
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with a nuclear bomb is automatically at par with the most powerful army in the world?
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And what does all this mean in the context of the Indian subcontinent?
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Since both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, does it make our conflict more dangerous
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Are those weapons ever likely to be used?
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Can they be controlled?
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What do armies really mean in this nuclear world?
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Welcome to The Seen and the Unseen, our weekly podcast on economics, politics, and behavioral
#
Please welcome your host, Amit Verma.
#
Welcome to The Seen and the Unseen.
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My subject for today is war in the nuclear age.
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And my guest is Lieutenant General Prakash Menon.
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General Menon is a director of strategic studies in the Takshashila Institution in Bangalore.
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And he served for 40 years in the army before that.
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He served at Siachen and at the Line of Control.
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And he was involved in counterinsurgency in Jammu and Kashmir.
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He has been the commandant of the National Defense College in Delhi.
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And here's what I find most fascinating about him.
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Here's an army general who also has a PhD.
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In fact, he expanded his PhD thesis into a book that you'll find on Amazon called The
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Strategy Trap, India and Pakistan Under the Nuclear Shadow.
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I had a fascinating conversation with him in Bangalore recently.
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But before we get to that, here's a quick commercial break.
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If this happens to be the only podcast you listen to, well, you need to listen to some
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Check out the ones from IVM Podcasts who co-produced the show with me.
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Go to ivmpodcasts.com or download the IVM app and you'll find a host of great Indian
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podcasts that cover every subject you could think of.
#
From the magazine I edit, Pragati, I think, pragati.com, there is the Pragati podcast
#
hosted by Hamsini Hariharan and Pawan Srinath.
#
There is a brilliant Hindi podcast, Puliyabazi, hosted by Pranay Kutaswamy and Saurabh Chandra.
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And apart from these policy podcasts, IVM has shows that cover music, films, finance,
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sports, sci-fi, tech and the LGBT community, all under one roof or rather all in one app.
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So download the IVM Podcasts app today.
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General Menon, welcome to the scene of the unseen.
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General Menon, one of the most fascinating things about your bio data, which I found
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which is like so impressive, the things that you've done in your 40 years of army service
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is the fact that you're also a PhD.
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You've done a doctorate, in fact, in the very subject that you later expanded into this
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book, The Strategy Trap.
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Tell us a little bit about how that came about.
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Yeah, actually, my PhD is by default, in the sense that it was triggered by a discussion
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when I was an instructor in staff college when India had just gone, become a nuclear
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power and we have this practice in staff college where a senior officer who comes to address
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the college has a discussion with the what we call directing staff, which is the instructional
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So there was this discussion and I was part of that discussion.
#
And during the discussion, the discussion was about now that India has gone nuclear,
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what does it mean for the Indian Armed Forces?
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During that discussion, I realized that what I instinctively thought about the fact that
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we've gone nuclear would make a lot of difference to what the armed forces can do was quite
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different from what most of them, in fact, all of them said.
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And I was a sole voice who said that now things are going to be profoundly different.
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And at one stage, in fact, I was given a shut up call by the commandant because I was arguing
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with the senior general of the army who was saying that nothing is going to be, I mean,
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everything is going to be the same.
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And I was saying, no, it's not the case.
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So that I think was a trigger which actually finally led me to my Ph.D. because I said
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And then I had a long journey.
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I could do my Ph.D. because I took two years of study leave.
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I located myself in this beautiful place called Bangalore, although I was doing a Ph.D. from
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Madras University because I was doing a project with NIAS, which is funded by the Department
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And it was a project which is congruent to my thesis of what is the impact of nuclear
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And I traveled and traveled all over India, I met people, discussed with them, traveled
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to the United States, I went to both the coasts, spoke to people in think tanks.
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But all their frame was primarily of the Cold War.
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So while there were some commonalities, I found that the Indo-Pak situation, the context
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demanded a different look.
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So two years passed, study leave was over, and I had not yet started on my Ph.D. My thesis
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was in my head actually.
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But I had not yet put it down on paper, I had a lot of notes, and then suddenly everything
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I completed the project with DAE, and it was a classified project, it still is.
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And then I went off to command a brigade in North Kashmir, I commanded the Haji Pir Brigade.
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And soon enough came Aup Parakram.
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And according to my thesis, Aup Parakram would not happen the way it was being planned.
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It was planned for being a big war.
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And according to me, such big wars are no longer possible between India and Pakistan.
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And actually Parakram, because nothing happened, we finally demobilized.
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But I couldn't write my thesis, and my professor by which time was telling me that I'm running
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out of time, that you have to complete your thesis because they have some certain regulations,
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university regulations and so on.
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And I was promising him that I'll do it.
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But there was no time that you could command a brigade in active operations, we were also
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involved heavily in counterinsurgency that I could write my thesis.
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So two years passed, but my professor was good enough, who understood the situation,
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sort of he managed to play around with the rules of the university and gave me some more
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time till I went to my next appointment at the center commandant where also it was not
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I ran into I learned the containment act instead of looking at my thesis because I was trying
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to sort out what I thought was a corrupt officer from the Indian Defense State Service.
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And my time eight months there passed like that before that.
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But well, I sort of I thought I'd sorted that officer out, but nothing happened to my thesis
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and I went on to my next this thing on a course in Delhi, the National Defense College and
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in the National Defense College, I could do a lot of reading and writing about what it
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But a thesis took still took a long time.
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So it was I started writing it there and it took some sort of shape, but it was not in
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the shape it could be presented.
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And then after one year, of course, I was posted back there, I did some more work.
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Then I then I was promoted and I was sent to South Kashmir where I was a GOC.
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And that's the time when my professor gave me a deadline and he said, if you don't complete
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by so and so date, your thesis cannot be accepted by the university.
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So as a commanding general of an active counterinsurgency force in Kashmir, I an early riser used to
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get up very early in the morning, they normally did, and I used to spend the time writing
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And that's how I completed my my thesis in service.
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And it's not the case that I wanted to do a PhD.
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But I think if not for that original discussion at the DSSC and my descent, because all the
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time was also involved with making plans, which according to me, cannot possibly be
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actually see fruition because they were dangerous and actually will not achieve what we want
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So he was a guy actually at the operational level in official capacity, making being part
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of a process that I didn't believe in.
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And therefore, my PhD became an antithesis of my official life.
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So your thesis was an antithesis to sort of.
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And I mean, I find the whole subject very fascinating in the sense of, of course, we
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all know that, you know, when two nuclear powers face off, there's a concept of nuclear
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deterrence and that prevents them going from war.
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And therefore, how you use force is sort of changes and is collaborated.
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But what you have done is you've located all of that in the context of the subcontinent
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and the particular challenges that we face, that India is nuclear, Pakistan is nuclear,
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And your main thrust, if I am not mistaken in stating it this way, is that the way we
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use conventional force has changed so drastically that it is impossible to use it in anything
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but the most limited way.
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And this most limited way will then also be relatively ineffective.
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And this presents a conundrum for us, for army and military strategists.
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Is that a correct summation?
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In the fact, see, one of the problems with nuclear weapons has done to the armed forces
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of all countries is to question their relevance, that why do you need it anymore?
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And that's the question which has been challenged because the problem is there are two parallel
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One is if you are a nuclear power and if you are being faced with another nuclear power,
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the paradigm says that your main aim is war prevention, to prevent war.
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Nuclear weapons are meant not for use, but to prevent it.
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And that's what Bernard Brody, in the initial phase of the late 40s, first propounded, that
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the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent war.
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But in the real world, there is conventional force which is there.
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And conventional force believes in the paradigm of achieving what you call decisive victories.
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So the real world is that you have this need for preventing big war, but you also have
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these conventional forces which all the time are planning to be used for decisive victories.
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So the two divergent thoughts, but they run parallel.
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And that is what has challenged all the armies of the world ever since nuclear weapons have
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And Indian and the Pakistani armies can be no different.
#
So I'm going to quote a little bit from your introduction where you talk about, I'll just
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quote this bit, start quote, after the Kargil conflict, three schools of thought emerged
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Some believed that a conventional war with Pakistan is no longer practical because of
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the possibility of the war escalating beyond the nuclear threshold.
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And that matches Pakistan's official view.
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Others are of the view that a war limited in space, time, and objectives is possible.
#
And Kargil was cited in support of the argument, which has also been India's official view.
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A third group believes that a full-fledged conventional war is possible because Pakistan's
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nuclear threats are bluffs that must be called since Pakistan could well be decimated, even
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though we could also suffer severe damage, close quote.
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Out of these three views, which is closest to what you believe?
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The first one, which is that actually the utility of force is now in question.
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Because if you want to use force, and a military actually is an instrument of politics, it's
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applied against the adversary to achieve political objectives.
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And those political objectives is finally about getting the enemy to do through force
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what you want them to do, to change their behavior or to do something which you don't
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So if that is the case, and in the India-Pakistan situation, I think it's very clear that what
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India wants to achieve politically is how do you stop Pakistan from using terror as
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a policy instrument of the state?
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And can that therefore be done by India going to war with Pakistan?
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With conventional forces.
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With conventional forces.
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I in fact totally, I sort of discount the idea of limited nuclear war.
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Because in my view, if nuclear weapons are used, then it will be extremely difficult
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to control the escalation, and therefore I also talk about when Pakistan is talking about
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tactical nuclear weapons, and normally the example given is that Pakistan uses tactical
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nuclear weapons on us because we have penetrated into their, I mean our armored spearheads
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have gone into that country, and therefore they are in danger and they can use tactical
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And they expect that India would probably give a proportionate reply, but that's not
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what the Indian doctrine says.
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Indian doctrine believes that if nuclear weapons are used, and we don't believe in the concept
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of tactical nuclear weapons because no use of nuclear weapons can have a tactical effect,
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and that is what classifies weapons as tactical or strategic.
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And I quote an example in the book that there's nothing, no weapon is strategic or tactical
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It is in the effect that it creates that it can be used strategically or it can be used
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And the example I quote is about somebody shooting the President of the United States
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The effect would be strategic, but that doesn't mean the pistol which has been used is strategic.
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It has been used strategically for strategic effect, though it is the effect which matters.
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So if a nuclear weapon, tactical nuclear weapon as Pakistan says is used, the effect will
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be strategic because of the fact that it will be used against us for the first time.
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Somebody has used it in war for the first time, it will have a worldwide reverberation.
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And to expect that the Indians will trust the Pakistanis that if they give a proportionate
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response, Pakistan will also now respond again proportionately, would be actually asking
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too much during that period of crisis of a leader who would be confronted with this problem
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that how do we now minimize damage to ourselves?
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If they use tactical nuclear weapons and we use tactical nuclear weapons or we don't have
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them or we use them tactically for whatever way that we want to, how do we know that the
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Pakistanis will not visit us with whatever they have, we would suffer greater damage.
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So the decision left to the political leaders, does he want to take this risk or would he
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now like to make sure that he hits them so hard that you minimize damage to yourself.
#
So these are issues which can actually never be answered fully because only a person put
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in that situation will have to decide how do you use it.
#
Also the Indian doctrine has some sort of a flexibility on how to confront this sort
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of problem which we have that anybody who uses nuclear weapons on us can expect that
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we will retaliate and that's a credible threat.
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The less credible threat is Pakistan telling us they will use it first because how will
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they use it first when they know that we can actually retaliate.
#
And a tactical nuclear weapon has this problem that if they use it in a small measure then
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our tactical, our nuclear weapons are intact and therefore we have the advantage of actually
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replying them with much greater response which can hurt them more than what they want to
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So you know these are the dilemmas of use of weapons.
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Any use of weapon is actually impractical so it cannot be used by irrational action.
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This is actually a very profound point and eye-opening for me this distinction that you
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made between the tactical use and the strategic use and we've often heard of tactical nuclear
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weapons and you just explained beautifully why it's not possible.
#
For the benefit of my listeners I'll just elaborate on what you mean by tactical and
#
strategic and tell me if I'm doing that correctly.
#
Tactical is you have a limited short-term objective like say someone has occupied a
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particular area and you want to get them out of there and what you do to achieve that limited
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And strategic is a larger objective of the war as it were, a larger long-term objective.
#
And your point is that even if they use or rather the Indian point of view here is that
#
even if they use a nuclear weapon for what seems to be the limited objective, let army
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ko yahan se bhagao, it will have strategic repercussions because it will change the way
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not just India but the whole, the way the whole world views that particular engagement
#
and it will just change the paradigm of India-Pakistan relations.
#
See the basic distinction which although there is no clear line is the magnitude of the effect
#
of using something, of applying force.
#
Does that magnitude of that effect your long-term goals?
#
The ones which are actually of a local nature which will disappear after some time which
#
does not impact so much, although it can have an impact on your long-term goal, but the
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impact is less and that is actually what differentiates between the tactical and strategic.
#
So what I want to do now is ask you about the different doctrines that different nuclear
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Like how have they formulated that?
#
But before that what strikes me as very interesting is that because we have almost a non-existent
#
sample size of nuclear nations actually getting into conflicts with each other, all of these
#
doctrines and everything that we understand about the subject is in the realm of theory.
#
Practically what happens and you use a famous phrase of fog of war in the conversation we
#
were happening just before we started recording and in practical terms what will happen in
#
the fog of war, you know when war actually begins and one event leads to another is something
#
that hasn't been tested yet and everything therefore is in the realm of theory.
#
Yeah, that's the problem actually and I say this in the book.
#
The problem with nuclear strategy is it cannot answer the question what happens when deterrence
#
See, all nuclear strategy is based on the fact that it is meant to deter.
#
It means it is meant to deter the other person from using nuclear weapons but some doctrines
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of other countries, most doctrines of other countries except India and China believe that
#
nuclear weapons can be threatened to be used against conventional force, against biological
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and chemical weapons but it is only India and China which believes that we think that
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nuclear weapons can deter only their kind and India also has another option for biological
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and chemical weapons where in the doctrine we say that we retain the option for retaliating
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with nuclear weapons if biological and chemical weapons are used against us which means we
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have not committed fully to using it if biological and chemical and which I think is a very wise
#
move because biological and chemical weapons although we call them weapons of mass destruction
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are actually of a different kind in the scale and the speed at which damage can be inflicted.
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Nuclear weapons scale and speed are unmatched by biological and chemical weapons and you
#
need a lot of biological and a lot of chemical weapons to achieve the same type of destruction.
#
So actually speaking they don't belong to the same basket although they are mass.
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So India very rightly has said that we retain the option and that's how we actually get
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So when you look at all these doctrines one of the things which distinguishes us in China
#
is that we have restricted our use of nuclear weapons to a very core deterrence role of
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The other nations United States, Russia, UK, France have all said that if they are attacked
#
with conventional weapons they threaten that they will use nuclear weapons and I think
#
so far if we just take the North Korean example the fact that North Korea is just a nuclear
#
state in its infancy can actually talk up and face the most powerful nuclear nations
#
in the world is lesson that you don't have to have many nuclear weapons to actually scare
#
off the other guy because of the fact that the magnitude even one nuclear weapon which
#
visits the United States or America or one of the cities would be enough for nuclear
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weapons for America to be worried about the fact that this is what can happen to us.
#
So deterrence is does not demand a big scale in the Cold War more than the United States
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and Russia had more than 60 to 70,000 weapons.
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That was a scale that was because they believe that numbers mattered but really numbers do
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not matter and I think that North Korea is now an example which can be quoted that numbers
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So why is it that what's the logic then behind India and China having this different sort
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of doctrine where they say that we will use nuclear weapons only if nuclear weapons are
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used against us and maybe other WMD as you said.
#
Yeah see the basic difference between India China and the rest is we are two countries
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who have really not used military force for coercion we have not threatened military force
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We've used it to defend our basically we are saying that we are military and we don't want
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to use nuclear weapons to coerce others.
#
China went nuclear because America used the threat of nuclear weapons to coerce China
#
soon after it became you know and I quote those examples when I cover the Chinese doctrine
#
where President Truman actually used them and he actually hasn't also threatened them
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So China is one country which has faced nuclear threats when it didn't have nuclear weapons.
#
It went nuclear only in 1964.
#
So it believed and Mao said this very clear that actually nuclear weapons are paper tigers
#
you can't threaten anybody with nuclear weapons but if you don't have nuclear weapons others
#
will threaten you with nuclear weapons and that is why they went nuclear and that is
#
also why India has also gone nuclear because we were threatened with nuclear weapons or
#
there was a threat which is developing from China and from Pakistan although China has
#
never threatened us overtly.
#
But the fact is we realized that if you don't have nuclear weapons you will be threatened
#
that means you will be coerced and therefore was the need for nuclear weapons and that
#
is why India and China.
#
Americans and Russians actually at one time they had switched from after the Soviet Union
#
broke up they said they had embraced NFU but now they've gone back again because they
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say that the conventional power is weak.
#
So we and China are different because we believe nuclear weapons are only meant for a defensive
#
It is not meant to actually coerce the other and that is where the difference is.
#
So I have a sort of game theoretical kind of question and forgive me if it's a naive
#
question because I'm a newbie to the subject but if the whole objective of having nuclear
#
weapons of deterrence is to avoid war so that people are scared to attack you then isn't
#
If you don't show that restraint and if you just say that hey we can use it anytime almost
#
like a game of chicken where they think that and perhaps game of North Korea is doing exactly
#
He may not really be as reckless and mad as he makes himself out to be but from a game
#
theoretical point of view if people think he is like that then that will increase the
#
credibility of the deterrence of his nuclear weapons because they'll think he's mad enough
#
to just send a bomb to Seoul anytime.
#
So from that point of view it strikes me as sort of counterintuitive that we would actually
#
impose a restraint on our use of nuclear weapons instead of saying that look if you attack
#
us all we'll do anything but instead of that if we just say that we will only use it against
#
other weapons of mass destruction then in a sense that emboldens Pakistan to use conventional
#
weapons and you know other means of warfare against us.
#
Yeah actually the situation is called a stability instability paradox that when you have nuclear
#
weapons on other both sides then you have stability at the higher level that means you
#
will not go in for a big fight because of the fact that the big fight might not turn
#
out to be both of you can get hurt very badly.
#
So you have stability there but you have instability at the lower level so because and that's exactly
#
what the Indian condition is it's typical of what it is and there Pakistan is advantaged
#
because they can use terror as a tool of foreign policy and India finds it is not able to retaliate
#
and stop them from using it.
#
So that's the instability and this we are disadvantaged all right but let's say that
#
suppose we also had a first use policy I mean the policy was first used.
#
This is a political decision of how you see nuclear weapons.
#
India does not see nuclear weapons as meant for military use.
#
It's purely a political weapon for prevent somebody from using it and it is politically
#
because one of the things about nuclear weapons is that because of the sheer destructive power
#
and the magnitude and speed of destruction anything you say or threaten the other nuclear
#
weapons goes directly to the decision maker on the other side you know that's the magnitude
#
So you can influence that mind where you can say you can influence the mind without just
#
issuing a small threat is enough to change behavior.
#
So this is what this also we are not only India Pakistan this thing we have actually
#
got we are in a situation where we have got another adversary in China.
#
So we have a triad here.
#
So it is from the belief the basic belief of what nuclear weapons are meant for that
#
are no first use doctrine actually come into play.
#
Any other thought is military in character it is not political in character and the politics
#
obviously is the one should guide what is military.
#
See that is why all military people do not agree with the idea that no first use is a
#
good thing because if militaries do not want to get hit first they would like naturally
#
Or at least have that credible.
#
But the problem with nuclear weapons is that first use is not credible because even if
#
you can be visited and returned by a couple of weapons it would really you would not use
#
it and also there is another complexity here.
#
Now that complexity comes from the fact that if there is a regional nuclear war let us
#
say we have a regional.
#
Studies now indicate that the whole global it is possible that it impact the globe in
#
climatically and that is going to be of concern to everybody else because of the fact that
#
firstly we are very densely populated in a space so as Pakistan so as India we are very
#
combustible in our cities a lot of energies reside in them.
#
So the type of smoke and this thing which we are going to throw around the world will
#
cause climate change which will affect the entire globe and probably depending upon the
#
intensity of what has happened it can cause widespread biological changes which will affect
#
your food chain your water and threaten existence in life itself because of the social turmoil
#
it's going to create in the rest of the world.
#
So world now knows that if India and Pakistan fights a nuclear war it's not going to be
#
contained to the effects in the subcontinent the world is going to be affected.
#
So the any idea who's saying that you know you're going to use this first has a credibility
#
problem and I think India has been very wise to the fact that we don't see this at all
#
Militaries don't like this idea because militaries don't like to wait to be hit and that's why
#
the whole Detens theory is based on what you call second strike capability.
#
So I have a follow up question on this but before that let's take a quick commercial
#
Welcome to another week on IVM podcast if you're not following us on social media please
#
do we're IVM podcast on Twitter Facebook and Instagram.
#
This week on Cyrus says Cyrus talks to restauranteers Pankil Shah, Abishek Kunawar and Sumit Kumbher
#
of Neighborhood Hospitality.
#
They talk about their past and they talk about their future.
#
They talk a lot more about their future in a new show that we got launching called The
#
Please make sure that you check that out as well.
#
In a two episode special on the Prakriti podcast Pawan and Hamsini are joined by author and
#
legal expert Rahul Mathan to discuss the Shri Krishna report and India's striss with the
#
On Shrinu one this week we have Vishal Gondal from the Vishal Gondal show.
#
He takes us through his journey on Gokhi and just a quick shout out to all of our listeners
#
along with the Kullaba Cartel we have a whole host of other shows launching this month.
#
So stay tuned to the IVM podcast app and make sure that you follow all of our new shows
#
Welcome back to the Scene in the Unseen.
#
I'm chatting with left-wing General Prakash Menon about nuclear weapons and the use of
#
force and how they change the dynamic between nations.
#
So my question for you General Menon then is that if we have decided that you know there's
#
a no first use doctrine and this is not a military weapon it's a political weapon to
#
scare the other guy and we're never actually going to use it.
#
But then doesn't it become a very weak political weapon if the other guy knows that hey India
#
is never going to use it so it doesn't matter and at the same time since we are not going
#
to retaliate to conventional attacks with nuclear weapons doesn't it actually in one
#
way make us weaker because earlier we could have engaged in unrestrained conventional
#
warfare but now we can't even do that because it might escalate and everybody knows we're
#
not going to use the nuclear weapons how does that affect the dynamic?
#
No we are not saying we won't use it we are saying that we will use it if you use nuclear
#
weapons if the adversary uses nuclear weapons.
#
So the fact is we don't want to bring the nuclear weapon into the equation as far as
#
war is concerned we're saying that we will not use it first that's the first point.
#
The second point is that if you the threat which we face today from both China and Pakistan
#
we do not intend to counter that threat through nuclear weapons because we do not believe
#
that nuclear weapons can be used that is the fundamental belief because if it is used and
#
if it is used between nuclear powers it will not only affect both those nations it will
#
affect the entire globe.
#
And what do Pakistan and China believe?
#
China has the same belief as us they believe that it's a political weapon in fact they
#
have nuclear doctrine is quite congruent to us that in fact Mao said that nuclear weapons
#
are paper tigers as a famous quote that he made and so as far as China is concerned we
#
are on the same we do not believe that within our this thing we'll bring nuclear weapons
#
with but as far as Pakistan is concerned it's a smaller power it sees India as a bigger
#
conventional power and it believes that if it wields the threat of nuclear weapons India
#
will not attack it conventionally.
#
My point is India does not have to attack Pakistan conventionally because now there
#
is no reason for doing so because you can't achieve much with it.
#
So we must first embrace the idea that going to war with Pakistan cannot achieve anything
#
much for what you actually want to fight the war why do you want to go to war with Pakistan
#
Why can't it achieve anything?
#
The problem is like this Pakistan with the nature of the state that it is is a jihadized
#
country it's actually controlled by the armed forces which is in power all the time whether
#
it is officially or not.
#
If you want to actually control Pakistan or you want this thing you will have to have
#
to defeat the Pakistan armed forces and if you defeat the Pakistani armed forces then
#
you need to control the land area of Pakistan and it's a jihadized state.
#
So why would you and unfortunately for us if Pakistan implodes let's say we go to war
#
with Pakistan and Pakistan armed forces actually are defeated and Pakistan therefore since
#
army is in control there Pakistan will implode let's say they will be complete civil disorder.
#
Sorry for interrupting but if the army faces an existential threat then they're very likely
#
to just use a nuclear weapon anyway right?
#
Yeah so why would you actually want to do that?
#
Why would you want to put them in that position?
#
What are you going to gain?
#
The point is you have to relate that war as an instrument for what you want to achieve.
#
Why are you going to war with Pakistan?
#
If you are going to war with Pakistan to stop Pakistan from using terror as a tool of foreign
#
policy then defeating the Pakistani armed forces will make Pakistan implode jihadists
#
probably might take over and the civilian population we can go nowhere else because
#
geography doesn't allow them they will come here we won't be able to stop them at the
#
borders and that probably if you look at India's own fault line it will obviously deepen that
#
fault line and we could be in serious trouble ourselves.
#
So we have a paradox here that we call it an adversary and if you go to war with them
#
defeat them then you might finally you yourself will be in trouble because of that defeat
#
So how do you actually now deal with this state through force?
#
So is force the correct way to deal with it?
#
Because if you are going to war what is your purpose and that purpose actually in this
#
case is self-defeating if you use force and that's something which Indian political leaders
#
And would it be correct to say that given the kind of terror operations that are carried
#
out from Pakistan against us constantly you know for the last couple of decades at least
#
that whatever we feel about it they are already at a state of war against us.
#
So my two questions there would be that does our having nuclear weapons make a difference
#
to how we tackle this and the second one would be how should we tackle this given the way
#
Yeah let's put it this way if we didn't have nuclear weapons I'm sure by now we would have
#
gone to war with Pakistan let's say in 2008 and all those things but probably although
#
it cannot be directly connected but you must say that the just the emotional fuel in India
#
about these terror attacks would have forced the politicians hand to actually go to war
#
but it hasn't happened and one of the reasons probably could be is that there's nuclear
#
But I think the main issue here is if terror is what Pakistan is going to use and terror
#
is a means it's actually it's not something which you can say that you can stop them from
#
using it because that's the means that a weak nation will use the means at his disposal
#
and Pakistan's strategy is about you know wounding India with a thousand cuts and these
#
Now if you look at India in the larger context we look at ourselves what where are we now
#
we are in the process of development.
#
Our main focus is not Pakistan our main focus is our own economic and social development.
#
If that is the focus then our strategy should be not get involved with the jihadist state
#
and try to reform it because we cannot.
#
Our strategy should be to contain it in such a manner that it does not affect our main
#
focus which is economic and social development.
#
So if we think that if we fall into the trap which Pakistan is laying out for us then come
#
and get enmeshed with them and start a ding-dong battle of a fight then I think in strategic
#
And that's a negative sum game where we have more to lose.
#
Yes of course and that is exactly what Pakistan wants in the sense that Pakistan's army main
#
strength comes from actually creating an Indian threat.
#
If that Indian threat is what keeps the rest of support the support of Pakistani army in
#
So for them to create the Indian threat is the strengthening.
#
We should be wary of when we deal with Pakistan with force that this is what Pakistan's strategy
#
If we know this is the gameplay then when we are hit and I suggest that in my book it
#
is not about hitting back because we want to stop them from doing what they want to
#
It is about retribution.
#
It will have an impact but we know that impact is temporary but it also got another major
#
It is to sort of assuage the hurt feelings of India's population itself who seeks revenge
#
because of an act of terror.
#
No politician can possibly say that we won't do anything no no we must they will have to
#
be seen as doing something.
#
So now the use of force is transformed into this ability to strike back not only to create
#
it will only create a tactical effect in Pakistan but the effect here would actually be what
#
matters politically which means we have done something to them.
#
So in a sense a surgical strike against Pakistan might have a limited tactical impact but a
#
greater strategic impact within the Indian discourse because in terms of optics and assuaging
#
the weighing masses it sort of calms down the lust for war in a sense.
#
Yes it is unfortunately that's the case.
#
So now how does the politician therefore control the cycle of revenge.
#
So one of the things I say in my book is we should now and as the militaries are organized
#
at the moment are organized for the big fight you know big fights cannot take place.
#
So firstly they have to be restructured re-engineered and we should have the capability to strike
#
This is the operational shift which I talk about in my book that we need to do this primarily
#
meant to see that if anything happens we must immediately strike back.
#
Then we hope that with the strike back the tactical equilibrium is re-established.
#
So you know you go back to normal.
#
So this will have the minimum disturbance on what we should concentrate on which is
#
economic and social development.
#
So that's just one of the things which I say.
#
But the danger here is how do you play back this retributive act which you have done and
#
connect it to your domestic politics.
#
The temptation for a government in power is to use it for electoral purposes and that
#
has got potential for taking things out of control because if you are going to benefit
#
from it electorally then you would like to play it up in such a manner that the other
#
side would we want to actually what do you call retaliate in kind.
#
So there is this danger here.
#
And what we see of the surgical strikes in the videos which is now coming after is this
#
I mean the fact is that now it's about how do we get the audience Indian audience in
#
support and tell them that you know and one of the things is there is a lot of emotional
#
fuel here which is in support of the fact that you are acting tough against the Pakistanis
#
because now in the Indian democratic discourse any action taken against this great enemy
#
of ours has got a lot of power and strengthens the government.
#
So here we are in a situation where we are nuclear powers there is this seduction of
#
using force for electoral purposes and that's dangerous.
#
I find this incredibly alarming because just a thought of a politician sitting in an air
#
conditioned cabin in New Delhi looking at his popularity numbers and saying okay what
#
can I do that will be good optics and using army action as a means to achieve popularity
#
among the masses who might be wanting strong action from him is very alarming because the
#
question then comes is that where does he draw the line and if there is a disconnect
#
in his mind between the actual consequences of war and you know what he is using it for
#
that's incredibly scary where does it stop.
#
Yeah I know that's the problem actually so fundamentally now it's a question of how do
#
you strike a balance between national interests and party interests.
#
Can the leadership actually rise above his party interests and look at national interests
#
and that's actually depends upon the type of leadership that we have and I'm sure in
#
course of time we'll find this constantly being played out and it will be interesting
#
to see as to how leadership will learn the lessons the question is they might start a
#
process which they may not be able to control and that's dangerous so it is better not to
#
start riding the tiger or the horse because you won't know where to get off.
#
In fact I find your presumption that such a balance can be struck between political
#
interest and national interest to be very idealistic because I don't think such a balance
#
can exist the immediate incentives of a prime minister will always be to ensure reelection
#
that's pretty much the bottom line with any politician so then the question then comes
#
in that are our institutions strong enough to withstand political pressures like one
#
of the beautiful things about one of the things which has worked about this great Indian experiment
#
is that our army has been sort of kept apart from politics and has sort of maintained its
#
distance and its autonomy to a certain extent as compared to Pakistan where the army kind
#
of runs the show and is the big big political force there do you see that distance under
#
See my I think the greater danger lies in the fact that such decisions are made by a
#
small oligarchy in the PMO instead of passing it through institutions which have been established
#
we should look at it holistically like the National Security Council which will look
#
at the whole issue of whether what should we do it is established primarily for this
#
purpose if you look at K Subrahmanyam who actually written about it and he said there
#
were two gives two prime examples of why National Security Council was required it is to prevent
#
individuals or a small oligarchy from making decisions and taking nations down a path which
#
actually is not been examined fully and he quotes Rajiv Gandhi's support of the LTT
#
which was done decision taken by a small group of people and he also quotes Indira Gandhi's
#
support of Bindramwale you know all these two major decisions we look at it retrospectively
#
they were decisions which if it was examined carefully for its repercussions would never
#
So the danger for us is the political leadership not using the institutions which have now
#
been put in place and after all these institutions have been put in place by the Vajpayee government
#
but when you are in power you can always bypass these institutions and actually is not only
#
our country but happens all over the world if you look at the Americans also on the decisions
#
taken there they're not able to get something done the way they want to do it they just
#
bypass the institution which is supposed to examine it so we can be no different but there
#
is a danger lurking there.
#
So I'd like to take the subject back to your book because I think I've done a slight disservice
#
by going off in with all these general questions and all these general directions part of your
#
book also while examining your thesis about the possible use of conventional forces during
#
nuclear weapons looks at your lessons from Kargil your lessons from Parakram where you
#
were a brigade commander and you said that you know had war broken out that would have
#
disproved your thesis and as it happens that didn't happen.
#
So can you tell me a little bit about these sort of these seminal moments where we discovered
#
and you could you know in the context of your thesis examine all of these developments.
#
Yeah actually starting with Kargil although my research into Kargil indicates to me that
#
Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons operational nuclear weapons which Musharraf himself has
#
admitted in his book but the Indians I think would have presumed that they have some sort
#
of nuclear capability vague but it was never discussed in the cabinet the only discussion
#
took place between General Malik and General Malik writes in his book between him and British
#
Mishra which is outside the cabinet I mean just an exchange a discussion between them
#
about the impact of nuclear weapons but there's nothing serious but yet the cabinet imposes
#
a restriction on the armed forces not to cross the L.C. I think the more reason for that
#
would have been that India's sensitivity to international support for the fight against
#
Pakistan I think that would have been the major is weighed on that decision and I may
#
not be nuclear weapons although we can never be sure of that.
#
So Kargil actually is now being quoted as one of the successes of limited war.
#
I would agree because in the sense it also tells us that it is a war which is limited
#
in geographic space in quantum of force which was used and also limited in its objective
#
which was just to get the Pakistanis out from the area where occupied.
#
This sort of war is possible and that's the type the so border skirmishes limited geographic
#
wars are what we are going to see as the forms of war as far as Pakistan are concerned.
#
Literally because there are nuclear weapons in play.
#
So if this is a type of war then we must also restructure ourselves to fight the type of
#
war which we're likely to fight.
#
But you know the problem is that we really do not know and the armies cannot be sure
#
as to how a war can start and where it can reach.
#
It has to be prepared for the hold hog because if it is not prepared for the higher level
#
then you might be at a disadvantage.
#
So conventional force doesn't go away.
#
Conventional force retains its ability to actually have deterrent power.
#
That is why having an aircraft carrier, having a fighter aircraft, they've all got tremendous
#
optical power, the ability to deter.
#
But whether we can use them against an enemy and fight a big war is what is questionable.
#
So the paradox is you need all these big things but you may not be able to use them the way
#
that they're meant to be used.
#
So at the level of deterrence there is this need for these sort of.
#
You need them to cast a shadow in the enemy's mind but you never actually.
#
So they're useful for deterrence but questionable whether we can use them and that's the paradox.
#
And what about Parakram because you were in a sense almost personally involved there and
#
you know before this podcast started and we were chatting in your cabin you told me about
#
how it was almost a big complicated situation for you because you felt that if war breaks
#
out my thesis will be disproved and at the same time you're preparing for that war and
#
You see I was commanding the Haji Pir Brigade and that brigade is actually what is called
#
a co-reserve brigade which means it is the offensive element, one of the offensive elements
#
So I have this big plethora of offensive plans which I make which is fundamentally about
#
And so I'm making all these plans and I'm rehearsing them and I'm briefing people and
#
briefing this thing is what I'm going to do.
#
But in my heart I have this thesis which says that this sort of war should not actually
#
So there is a contradiction between my what I do officially and what it is and then finally
#
I am proved right because war never takes place because it could not have taken place
#
according to my thesis.
#
So my thesis survives Parakram and Parakram therefore is a good example and we have learned
#
Now we learned the lesson which the army took away was that you know one of the reasons
#
why Parakram didn't take place because we got slow to mobilize because we had this very
#
large formations which we call our strike corps which took a long time to get to the
#
frontier by which time actually the Pakistanis.
#
So that is why was born what is called the Cold Start Doctrine.
#
The Cold Start Doctrine believes that we can strike before he gets prepared basically that's
#
This is another military friction which can actually it's good to try and scare the other
#
through Cold Start because Cold Start means that you have to move formations very close
#
to the western border and then you have to apply them very speedily before that guy can
#
But in the Indo-Pak context it's difficult to do that because when you move from the
#
hinterland all these formations then Pakistan also can also move them because this you have
#
to do in peace because you have to relocate them and once you relocate them then nothing
#
stopping from him relocating you.
#
So what happened after Cold Start has been in motion for some time now is that both of
#
us have relocated some formations and he has also done the same.
#
So we are now back to square one and more than anything else it is a doctrine which
#
Pakistan has run with by saying that look at the Indians they've got this Cold Start
#
Doctrine that is why we are saying that they pose a serious threat to us.
#
So they've used that threat to increase their own power within the domestic polity and also
#
tell the international community see how the Indians are threatening us and focusing attention
#
on the Indo-Pak border which they want to paint as the most dangerous flash point in
#
the world because that suits their interests.
#
And you know through this book it's very interesting to see you know your thinking on these subjects
#
but how is the thinking of the Indian Army changed over all of this because as you pointed
#
out almost no one was on the side when all this began.
#
How has that changed over the years not just with you know new theoretical thinking on
#
it such as yours but also the experience of having gone through Kargil, Parakram, you
#
know the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks?
#
See the point I make in my book is the army has no other choice but try to see as to how
#
they can make themselves relevant in this situation.
#
I do not see any major restructuring which the armed forces has done to make them relevant
#
except for this Cold Start Doctrine which I think is military fiction.
#
So the army has been trying to discover operational virtuosity which is the word I use to see
#
as to how we can overcome this problem.
#
But my point is that such operational virtuosity cannot exist in this structural situation
#
India finds itself between the fact that this is what the geography is, the nuclear weapons
#
That structural situation is not redeemable through operational virtuosity.
#
You have to make the political leaders understand what force is meant for, what it's possible
#
for them to do and then you need a dialogue to make that happen.
#
But in the Indian instance the dialogue is not there.
#
The dialogue is spasmodic if it ever exists.
#
So the politicians when it comes to it will probably be episodic to a particular situation
#
then forget about it because they move on to many other things.
#
So we suffer now from a systemic problem that we have yet to crystallize.
#
What do we need the armed forces for?
#
What is the political objectives we need to resume?
#
That is why we don't have a national strategy neither do we have a military strategy because
#
all this has to come the fact that what does India want to do?
#
What sort of a military power that we want?
#
The meta question, how do we balance our continental and maritime power?
#
Because it is obvious to us that as far as international politics is concerned maritime
#
power will be the ones which we can make a difference.
#
Continental power is where we can't project power because we are locked here with Pakistan
#
and nuclear power with China and the mountains and so on.
#
So we have to make this decision about how do we shape the military instrument.
#
India because of its institutional inadequacies have not been able to make these decisions
#
and therefore we continue to actually do it in parts.
#
Would it then be correct to say that because we are a nuclear power facing other nuclear
#
powers like Pakistan and China especially Pakistan we are stuck between a rock and a
#
On the one hand we have nuclear weapons but everybody knows that our whole objective is
#
not to use them and therefore we are going to be very restrained and on the other hand
#
because we have those nuclear weapons we cannot use conventional forces beyond a certain threshold
#
as you point out which is why Parakram didn't happen and Kargil is pretty much an exemplar
#
of the kind of force that can be used but no more than that.
#
It then strikes me as a dilemma that like you said what is the role of the military?
#
So the challenge of the military is the fact is that force is not going to go away.
#
It has to change its forms to suit the situation.
#
Today that force which we call the kinetic force is now sort of morphed itself into many
#
other ways and cyber actually is a good example of what is possible.
#
Therefore India has to identify those capacities and therefore use those capacities for the
#
ability to either destroy, hurt or cause pain which can be used and identify the types of
#
war for which it should be prepared to fight.
#
I am afraid that the armed forces continue to be focused on what is called the Napoleonic
#
era of the decisive battle where you bring the armed forces of the others to a decisive
#
battle and beat them conclusively.
#
We have to get out of that mindset and look to the present, the contemporary era to how
#
do we now identify the types of war we must be ready to fight.
#
So you have types of war and at the same time how do we actually manage the issue of deterrence
#
where you need optical power and this is what China does very well where you need these
#
You can't say that you don't need aircraft carriers or so on.
#
They all have their uses.
#
The question is how do you mesh these two and make it into a coherent strategy which
#
must be a military strategy, not an army, air force or a naval strategy.
#
Unfortunately our structures as we are now, we don't have a CDS and you know the state
#
in which the MOD is, none of these things are possible.
#
So we continue to function in silos and that I think is a great bane because strategy requires
#
the understanding of the nature of the whole as Clausewitz would have put it.
#
It's been a fascinating discussion and I'm going to end with asking you two questions
#
that I ask all my guests on their subject of expertise.
#
What makes you hopeful and what makes you despair about the changing nature of war in
#
Well, that we will keep our ambitions in check because there is a danger that we might cross
#
the line which we do not want and get hurt more than what we actually, that danger that
#
the very fact that uncertainty will keep ambitions in check.
#
So force will not be used the way it has been used through centuries, which is when we disagree
#
then I take it forcefully from you, you know, that's one of the things which makes me hopeful.
#
But the larger issue now is if you look at the world today and if you see the confrontation
#
building up at global geopolitics and even Asian geopolitics, the danger of a clash between
#
the big guys is increasing.
#
Both of them are very cognizant of the fact that in the previous era, when these sort
#
of things took place, you could go to war and you would arrive finally, however painfully
#
at some sort of an equilibrium which that war would bring about.
#
But now the problem is that you can't go to war in that manner.
#
So nations have been going to war through proxies and that's been the way it's done.
#
But the danger is that today, the pace at which wars are going to be conducted, the
#
sheer speed at which you're going to exchange energy would actually enmesh the military
#
so fast that it can go easily out of political control, that the whole grammar of war will
#
actually drive the momentum of war and it will lose political control.
#
And when war loses political control and is overtaken by military logic, then we are in
#
With that incredibly horrifying and scary thought, let me thank you so much General
#
Menon for coming on the show.
#
It's been a great pleasure.
#
If you enjoyed listening to the show, do head on over to your nearest bookstore and pick
#
up General Menon's book, The Strategy Trap, India and Pakistan Under the Nuclear Shadow.
#
You can follow him on Twitter at Prakash Menon.
#
You can follow me at Amit Verma, A-M-I-T-V-A-R-M-A.
#
And for past episodes of The Scene and the Unseen, head on over to sceneunseen.in.
#
Hurry, do it right now before someone nukes us and you no longer can.
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That's right, we interrupt this riveting broadcast to tell you about our show, The
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